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Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain:
What Digital Copyright Can Learn from Antitrust
Timothy K. Armstrong
Abstract
This article, written for the inaugural volume of the University of
Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, explores the
disconnect between contemporary United States intellectual property law
and the often quite different consensus views of disinterested expert
opinion. Questions concerning how copyright law treats the public domain
(that is, uncopyrighted material) supply a lens for comparing the law as it
stands with the law as scholars have suggested it should be. The ultimate
goal is to understand why a quarter century of predominantly critical
scholarship on intellectual property seems to have exerted such limited
influence on Congress and the courts. Comparing recent copyright history
with the dramatic shift in federal antitrust law that occurred during the last
four decades in response to academic criticism from the law-andeconomics movement, this article asks whether today’s would-be
copyright reformers have anything to learn from the transformation of
antitrust law.
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The fact is that no other . . . statute has been subjected to so steady a
barrage of hostile commentary . . . Indeed, the scholarly and professional
literature on the statute resembles a cascade of vituperation.
—Robert H. Bork1
I.

Introduction

Judge Bork was talking about the Robinson-Patman Act,2 not the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA).3 Nevertheless, Bork’s palpable frustration that Congress has suffered
such ill-conceived legislation to exist surely resonates with many contemporary copyright
scholars. A rich copyright literature has emerged over the last generation that emphasizes the
importance of enforcing reasonable limits on copyright’s exclusive rights in order to spur
creative output and foster technological innovation. Copyright scholars could be forgiven for
asking, however, whether anyone is listening. Judges have said they find little value in academic
writings.4 The courts have issued decisions that simply fail to engage with the relevant research. 5
And frustration over the inability to alter the frame of the debate has driven one of its bestknown scholars, Professor Lawrence Lessig, from the copyright field entirely.6
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 385 (1978). Although most
widely remembered today for his failed nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987, the late Judge Bork was for many
years a scholar of antitrust law, whose The Antitrust Paradox is rightly regarded as a seminal work in the field. See
William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust
Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413 (1990), reprinted in EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST POLICY FROM JOHNSON TO BUSH
275 (Robert F. Himmelberg, ed., 1994).
1

2

Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a–13b).

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in relevant part at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205).
3

See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). On the other hand, other judges believe that locating pertinent sources in the scholarly
literature is indispensable to sound decision-making. See John Minor Wisdom, Wisdom’s Idiosyncrasies, 109 YALE
L.J. 1273, 1278 (2000) (recommending that judges and law clerks proactively seek out law review articles on point).
4

5

See infra notes 275–302 and accompanying text.

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST xii–xiii (2011). In 2008, copyright expert William Patry, author of
the Patry on Copyright treatise, made a similar point when he announced the end of his popular copyright blog:
6

I regard myself as a centrist. I believe very much that in proper doses copyright is
essential for certain classes of works, especially commercial movies, commercial sound
recordings, and commercial books, the core copyright industries . . . . But in my view, …
we are well past the healthy dose stage and into the serious illness stage . . . . [T]hings are
getting worse, not better . . . . [T]he most important stories are too often ones that involve
initiatives that are, in my opinion, seriously harmful to the public interest. I cannot
continue to be so negative, so often. Being so negative, while deserved on the merits,
gives a distorted perspective of my centrist views, and is emotionally a downer.
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In antitrust law, however, Judge Bork and his compatriots conquered the world. What
began as an insurgent intellectual movement challenging a reigning orthodoxy spread outwards
from the University of Chicago until it ultimately displaced the incumbent legal regime. This
recent transformation of antitrust law in response to earlier academic criticism may supply a
template for today’s would-be copyright reformers. At the very least, comparing some of the
attributes of a law reform movement that was, on its own terms, successful (whatever one’s view
of the merits of the resulting legal regime) with the attributes of a reform movement that has so
far struggled to produce a lasting impact on policy may yield useful insights for transformative
legal projects across a variety of subject matter domains.
Part II of this article considers the profound reorientation of United States antitrust law
along the lines sketched out by commentators affiliated with the so-called “Chicago School” of
law and economic analysis. The article examines how the Chicago School’s academic critique of
existing legal rules began to influence, and ultimately to displace, those very rules. The Chicago
School’s influence is easily traced through a series of court decisions showing the gradual
acceptance of arguments based on principles of neoclassical microeconomics.
In Part III, the terrain shifts from antitrust law to copyright law and the time frame
advances by few decades. The article summarizes, in broad terms, a related family of criticisms
of copyright law that took root in the legal academy and elsewhere in the mid-1990s, primarily in
response to perceived legislative and judicial overreach. The sketch of this critical copyright
literature, and the reform movement that it produced, is necessarily incomplete due to the
ongoing nature of the reform efforts, the lack of political or organizational cohesion among many
of the persons most prominently identified with the movement, and the diversity of opinion both
as to the most salient problems and the contours of proposed solutions.
Part IV continues by assessing the record of copyright reformist arguments in the courts
to date. The contrast with antitrust is an unhappy one. In case after case, reformist arguments
have been rebuffed or simply ignored. To be sure, the story is not uniformly bad for would-be
copyright reformers; glimmers of more hospitable judicial attitudes appear from time to time and
statements supporting reformist policy have occasionally emerged from unlikely quarters. But on
the whole, the record is discouraging.
Part V seeks to connect the discussions in the preceding sections by asking what
conditions underlay the earlier transformation of antitrust law and whether it is possible to
borrow and replicate some of those conditions to transform digital copyright law. The goal here
is not exhaustively to catalog the necessary measures that copyright reformers might embrace,
but only to suggest possible directions for further conversation and advocacy.

William Patry, End of the Blog (Aug. 1, 2008), at http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/08/end-of-blog.html.
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II.

Origins and Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine

Federal antitrust policy7 in the United States rests upon a series of extremely terse
statutes. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act8 outlaws “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations[.]”9 Section 2 of the same statute forbids “monopoliz[ing], or
attempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing] or conspir[ing] with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of” interstate or foreign commerce.10 Section 7 of the Clayton Act11 forbids
corporate mergers and acquisitions “where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly.”12 And the Federal Trade Commission Act13 declares “unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair acts or practices in or affecting commerce” to be
unlawful.14 In consequence of the breadth, generality, and brevity of the governing statutes,
virtually the entirety of substantive United States antitrust law is judge-made,15 its contours
shaped by the ebb and flow of judicial thinking over time.
The 1960s and ensuing decades witnessed a transformation in antitrust law driven by
changes in judicial attitudes rather than statutory revision. These changes in judicial doctrine, in
turn, were influenced by changes in academic thinking about economic regulation in general and

Largely for historical reasons, the body of law universally known elsewhere as “competition law” is
referred to as “antitrust” in the United States. See, e.g., RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA:
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (rev. ed. 1996).
7

An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7).
8

9

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).

10

Id. § 2.

An act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes, ch.
323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).
11

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). Although as originally enacted this provision of the Clayton Act forbade only
anticompetitive mergers via stock acquisition, Congress later expanded its scope to include anticompetitive
acquisition of another firm’s assets as well. See Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
12

An act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its powers and duties, and for other purposes, ch.
311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58).
13

14

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).

For students not versed in antitrust principles, the best analogy may be to copyright law’s fair use doctrine,
which places a minimum of statutory scaffolding, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), under a highly complex set of judgemade tests and rules; the primary difference being that antitrust law relies equally on judge-made rules to define
what conduct constitutes an antitrust violation in the first instance, not merely what conduct may constitute a
defense to liability.
15
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competition policy in particular.16 Without attempting to catalog exhaustively the changes in
antitrust doctrine over the last few decades, it is worthwhile at least to trace the broadest outlines
of the path the law has charted.
Almost since the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has recognized that not
every restraint of trade threatens the harm that prompted Congress to act. Virtually from its
inception, therefore, United States antitrust law has drawn a dividing line between those
commercial activities deemed illegal per se—meaning, categorically forbidden in every
instance—and those whose legality may be determined only upon a fact-specific inquiry into
competitive effects, using what has become known as the “rule of reason.” In the Court’s words:
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to
establish their illegality—they are “illegal per se.” In the second category
are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by
analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons why it was imposed.17
Much of the evolution in antitrust thinking during the past generation has resulted from
courts changing, in response to developments in the scholarly literature, which mode of analysis
they apply to particular challenged arrangements, the per se rule or rule-of-reason analysis. As
discussed below, the trend has been in the direction of greater reliance on the rule of reason, with
a pronounced reduction in the types of cases deemed appropriate for per se rules. Because ruleof-reason analysis differs from the per se approach in its reliance upon proof of particular market
effects, it naturally invited further development of an academic and professional literature on
those topics. Faced with an expanding body of economic literature purporting to illuminate the
likely competitive effects of various business arrangements, the courts responded by changing
the law to make that literature relevant.
In the first eight decades following the enactment of the Sherman Act, the courts
identified a wide variety of business practices that constituted per se violations of the antitrust
laws.18 Then-Circuit Judge Taft declared horizontal price-fixing agreements among competitors
A brief but accessible overview of this evolution in antitrust doctrine is available in Nolan Ezra Clark, The
Future of Antitrust Enforcement, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 401 (1986).
16

National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). On the development and
evolution of “rule-of-reason” analysis in antitrust cases, see generally id. at 686–91. See also Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
17

The discussion that follows purposefully elides a substantial portion of the complexity of antitrust
development, such as statutory enactments subsequent to the Clayton and FTC Acts, and the many cases that
qualified or limited some of the doctrines the Supreme Court announced in the cases cited in this paragraph. My
purpose herein is not to provide a grounding, however rudimentary, in the substantive law of antitrust (a topic in
which I claim no special expertise), but rather to state the basis for the discussion that follows concerning the
18
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to be illegal in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.19 The formation of a holding company
designed to control the stock of two or more former competitors—the classic “trust”
arrangement—was categorically outlawed in Northern Securities Co. v. United States.20 Resale
price maintenance agreements—contracts imposed by a manufacturer on its distributors
requiring them to resell the manufacturer’s products at or above a specified price, or else lose
their distributorship—were declared illegal in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co.21 So-called “tying” arrangements, which conditioned a consumer’s purchase of a desired
product upon the consumer’s agreement to also purchase a second (possibly undesired) product,
were outlawed in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States.22 Group boycotts or concerted
refusals to deal, in which two or more competitors refuse to do business with an upstream
producer or downstream customer unless the producer or customer ceases to do business with a
competitor of the group, were outlawed in Fashion Originators’ Guild v. FTC.23 Agreements
among competitors to divide markets along territorial lines were forbidden in Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States.24 And vertical non-price restraints, such as agreements imposed by
a manufacturer forbidding its dealers to carry competing products, were declared unlawful in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.25
Even outside the universe of per se unlawful restraints of trade, other elements of
antitrust jurisprudence as it existed before the late 20th century appear as historical anachronisms
to contemporary eyes. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,26 for example, the Supreme Court
condemned on antitrust grounds a merger of two corporations who controlled relatively

transformation of antitrust law in response to economic criticism. To borrow a metaphor, the actual substantive rules
of antitrust law are the chessmen on a board, and my interest lies neither in where they began nor where they ended
up so much as in how they came to be moved during the game.
85 F. 271, 291–301 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also, e.g., United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396–401 (1927).
19

193 U.S. 197 (1904). The Court specifically emphasized that, in its view, the Sherman Act outlawed “every
combination or conspiracy which would extinguish competition between otherwise competing railroads” and was
“not limited to restraints of … trade or commerce that are unreasonable in their nature[.]” Id. at 331 (emphasis in
original).
20

21

220 U.S. 373 (1911). See also, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45–47 (1960).

258 U.S. 451, 457–58 (1922). See also, e.g., United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
22

23

312 U.S. 457 (1941).

24

341 U.S. 593 (1951).

25

388 U.S. 365 (1967).

26

370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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minuscule shares of the market in which they competed.27 Even corporate mergers that promised
to yield greater efficiencies that would ultimately lead to lower consumer prices were invalidated
essentially on the grounds that Congress preferred two competitors to one.28
Antitrust law in this era was hardly divorced from economics. To the contrary, thenprevailing economic theory maintained that industries characterized by a highly concentrated
structure with few competitors tended to underperform more competitive industries.29 Backed by
supportive economic theory and by exhortations from the Supreme Court, federal antitrust
enforcers embarked on lengthy litigation campaigns aimed at fundamentally restructuring key
domestic industries, including landmark cases against AT&T30 and IBM.31
Nevertheless, this entire edifice came under sustained attack from the new “Chicago
School” strand of neoclassical economic theory beginning around the 1960s, with the volume of
criticism rising steadily over the two to three decades that followed.32 Nowhere was the criticism
sharper than with respect to the Court’s treatment of vertical restraints—agreements between
parties at different levels in the distribution chain, such as manufacturers and distributors.33 As
early as 1960, for example, the Dr. Miles decision’s categorical prohibition of resale price
maintenance had been attacked by economists, who argued that the practice could have pro-

The acquiring company, Brown, held approximately 4% of the United States retail market for shoes; the
acquired company, Kinney, held approximately 1.6%. Id. at 303.
27

See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also
result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.”) (citing Brown Shoe); United States
v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966) (describing “basic purpose” of the antitrust laws as “to prevent
concentration in the American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business”) (footnote
omitted).
28

See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4 (2d ed. 1980).
For economic analyses of some of the types of conduct then condemned as per se violations of the antitrust laws,
see, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
29

The AT&T litigation lasted over three decades and led ultimately to the company’s divestiture of its
regional subsidiaries, the so-called “Baby Bells,” that provided local telephone service. See United States v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
30

The IBM litigation lasted for thirteen years before being effectively dropped during the first Reagan
Administration. See In re International Business Machines Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982).
31

See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and
Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 329, 331 (1968) (complaining that Warren-era antitrust decisions appeared to rest
upon “a peculiar blend of modern economic theory and Populism” and that “[t]he growing body of economic
knowledge concerning the effects of vertical integration, resale price maintenance, territorial and other restrictions
on distributors, and tying arrangements have been virtually ignored.”); Jerrold G. van Cise, The Future of Per Se in
Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964) (arguing that courts should limit application of rules of per se illegality).
32

33

See supra notes 21, 22, 23, 25 and accompanying text.
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consumer consequences.34 The per se prohibition against tying arrangements was criticized by
economists who noted that essentially the same economic results could be achieved through
vertical integration, a practice not subject to the per se rule.35 Group boycotts or concerted
refusals to deal, some argued, might be pursued for a variety of reasons only some of which
resulted in the lessening of competition in the market and were therefore likewise inappropriate
for per se condemnation.36 Similarly, restrictions on distribution and other non-price vertical
restraints were judged by some observers to be too varied in their effects from one case to
another to justify their absolute prohibition under a per se rule.37 Indeed, because pro-consumer
effects of vertical restraints were likely to predominate in most circumstances, Bork went so far
as to argue that “every vertical restraint should be completely lawful.”38
The law’s treatment of horizontal restraints, too, came in for substantial criticism. The
per se rule against price-fixing and other agreements among competitors, some argued, swept too
broadly, forbidding at least some pro-consumer arrangements39 and slowing the pace of
cooperative innovation.40 The Court’s sweeping condemnation of horizontal mergers even in the

See Lester G. Tesler, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (Oct. 1960); see
also, e.g., Thomas W. Gilligan, The Competitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 17 RAND J. ECON. 544 (1986);
Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Resale Price Maintenance Re-examined: Monsanto v. Spray-Rite (1984), in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 364 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, eds., 3d ed. 1999).
34

See Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy, 68 AM. ECON.
REV. 397, 400–01 (1978) (arguing for rule-of-reason treatment of both tying arrangements and vertical integration).
See also, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 345 (1985).
35

See Joseph P. Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1979); C. Coleman Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to
Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247.
36

See Almarin Phillips, Schwinn Rules and the “New Economics” of Vertical Relations, 44 ANTITRUST L.J.
573 (1975); Earl E. Pollock, The Schwinn Per Se Rule: The Case for Reconsideration, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 557
(1975).
37

38

BORK, supra note 1, at 288.

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981); Robert H. Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 429–65 (1966).
39

See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements
Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579 (1993). In an era when the
United States was particularly sensitive to the perceived risk of losing ground in the innovative arena to foreign
(and, especially, Japanese) competition, suggestions that the antitrust laws were hampering economically necessary
forms of cooperation among American firms drew swift legislative responses. See, e.g., National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984); National Cooperative Production Amendments of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993).
40
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face of evidence that post-merger scale economies and efficiency gains would result in lower
prices41 was criticized as inherently inimical to consumer welfare.42
In response to these criticisms, the law began to change. Just ten years after declaring
distribution restrictions and other vertical non-price restraints to be illegal per se in the Schwinn
case,43 the Supreme Court reversed course, holding in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.
that such restrictions could be lawful under rule-of-reason analysis.44 The GTE Sylvania Court
noted that “[t]he great weight of scholarly opinion ha[d] been critical of” its prior decision in
Schwinn, which had caused “continuing controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals
and in the federal courts.”45 The Court then considered the teachings of economic literature on
vertical non-price restraints such as those at issue. Noting that previous cases applying per se
rules of antitrust liability had presumed that the challenged conduct was inherently pernicious,
the Court found such a presumption inappropriate where vertical restraints were involved
“because of their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and
stimulation of interbrand competition.”46 Because “[e]conomists ha[d] identified a number of
ways in which manufacturers can use such [vertical] restrictions to compete more effectively
against other manufacturers,”47 the Court concluded, “the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be
overruled.”48
As summarized above, many other rules of per se antitrust liability had grown up over the
decades before GTE Sylvania.49 Within thirty years after GTE Sylvania, however, most of those
precedents would be overruled or substantially narrowed. In 1988, the Court effectively extended
GTE Sylvania by mandating rule-of-reason analysis for all vertical restraints that did not
incorporate agreements on prices or price levels.50 In 1997, the Court held that vertical maximum

41

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 305–06 (1975) (criticizing
Supreme Court’s Brown Shoe decision for outlawing a merger based on fears that the merged firm would charge
lower, rather than higher, prices).
42

43

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

44

433 U.S. 36 (1977).

45

Id. at 47–48.

Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 51 n.18 (discussing academic literature on market effects of
vertical restraints); id. at 69–70 & n.10 (White, J., concurring) (same).
46

47

Id. at 54–55.

48

Id. at 58.

49

See supra notes 18–28 and accompanying text.

50

See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735–36 (1988).
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price-fixing arrangements must be evaluated under the rule of reason.51 A decade later, with
extensive citations to economic literature, the Court mandated rule-of-reason analysis for
minimum resale price maintenance agreements as well.52
Without formally overruling its precedents declaring tying arrangements to constitute a
per se antitrust violation,53 the Supreme Court effectively retreated from a per se rule beginning
in 1977 by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate market power and competitive harm from the
defendant’s conduct, ordinarily components of a rule-of-reason analysis.54 Even horizontal
agreements among competitors, the Court recognized in 1984, could be evaluated under the rule
of reason where “horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all.”55 The Court applied rule-of-reason analysis to concerted refusals to deal during
the 1980s,56 although it retreated from those rulings (over a vigorous dissent) a few years later. 57
The Court also ruled that horizontal mergers could not be attacked on the grounds that they
would yield lower, rather than higher, consumer prices.58 The Supreme Court, moreover, held
that a plaintiff’s complaint alleging an antitrust violation could not even proceed beyond the

See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 149 (1968)).
The courts’ historic per se condemnation of price-fixing, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, survives today
only as regards horizontal price-fixing between competitors, see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’y, 457
U.S. 332, 342–55 (1982), although even this rule may now be open to doubt: Maricopa relied for its per se rule
partly on the Court’s reasoning in Albrecht (see 457 U.S. at 347), and Albrecht has since been overruled by Khan.
51

See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–99 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)).
52

53

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (requiring inquiry into
“probability of anticompetitive consequences” from challenged tying arrangement); United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (requiring proof of market power). See generally Illinois Tool Works
Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33–39 (2006) (reviewing history of Court’s tying jurisprudence and
noting several steps the Court had taken to weaken per se condemnation of tying arrangements); id. at 43
(condemnation of tying arrangement “must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a
mere presumption thereof”) (footnote omitted).
54

55

National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).

See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986); Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293–98 (1985).
56

Compare Federal Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (applying per
se rule to group boycott), with id. at 438–46 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing against
per se condemnation of group boycotts that involve an expressive component).
57

See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 114–17 (1986). The Court signaled its retreat from
the principles it had described as animating the antitrust laws two decades earlier, noting that there was now
“considerable disagreement” whether the antitrust laws should be so construed as to “keep small competitors in
business at the expense of efficiency.” Id. at 116 n.11; cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text.
58
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pleading stage if economic theory suggested reasonable grounds for the defendants to engage in
the actions alleged.59
By the first decade of the 21st century, the transformation was complete: what had
originated as the Chicago School’s critique of antitrust law had itself become the law. Judge
Posner introduced a new edition of his book Antitrust Law by trumpeting the fact that ChicagoSchool economic analysis and the substantive law of antitrust had melded together so thoroughly
that it no longer made sense to speak of the two as distinct:
The first edition of this book, published a quarter of a century ago, bore
the subtitle “An Economic Perspective,” implying there were other
perspectives. . . . In the intervening years, the other perspectives have
largely fallen away, a change that I have marked by dropping the subtitle
from this new edition.60
III.

The Public Domain in Copyright Law

The public domain lies outside the borders of intellectual property:61 it contains material
not protected by a copyright, patent, or other intellectual property right62 and therefore “free as
the air to common use.”63 The public domain constitutes a special form of what economists
59

See Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW vii (2d ed. 2001) (footnote omitted); see also id. at ix (“Almost
everyone professionally involved in antitrust today—whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed
observer—not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also
agrees on the essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine the consistency of specific
business practices with that goal.”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE v (1994) (“Today the union of antitrust and economics is so complete that one
cannot study antitrust seriously without at least some exposure to economics.”).
60

61

See James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2003).

See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964). This is perhaps the most common understanding of the term “public
domain”; however, as discussed below, other ways of identifying the public domain exist. To take only one example,
uncopyrightable elements within an otherwise protected work—such as individual facts within an original factual
compilation, or functional components within a computer program—may be freely reused by others and are
therefore in some sense a part of the public domain as well, notwithstanding that the work in which they appeared is
subject to copyright protection. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,
359 (1991) (recognizing that uncopyrightable facts remain free to copy even after being incorporated into a
potentially copyrightable compilation); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 234 (1990) (recognizing that addition of
copyrightable material to public domain story elements does not confer copyright ownership over those story
elements); Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992) (“material found in the
public domain . . . is free for the taking and cannot be appropriated by a single author even though it is included in a
copyrighted work”).
62

International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“once the patent or
63
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recognize as a “commons,” a zone from which no economic actor has a right to exclude others.64
Material formerly protected by an intellectual property right may enter the public domain
through expiration of the statutory term of protection (in the case of copyrights and patents),65
through the owner’s noncompliance with a legal condition required for protection,66 or through
the owner’s voluntary relinquishment of rights.67 The public domain also includes material
statutorily defined as ineligible for intellectual property protection such as federal government
works.68
Because the public domain consists of material outside the coverage of copyright,
changes in copyright law’s outer boundaries over time necessarily affect the content of the public
domain.69 For example, legislative extensions of the copyright term slow the entry of
copyrighted works into the public domain.70 Similarly, because the existence of copyright rights
copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution”); TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“In general, unless an intellectual property right
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.”); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,
674 (1969) (noting “the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain”).
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 14–15 (2003). The analogy to commonses in traditional property nomenclature is necessarily inexact
because the nonrivalrous character of intellectual property goods prevents “intellectual commonses” from becoming
depleted through overuse. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
47–49 (2008).
64

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304 (2012) (specifying duration of copyright protection); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012)
(specifying duration of patent protection).
65

See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (certain disclosures made by the inventor more than one year
before filing of application for patent may bar issuance of patent).
66

Doctrines of abandonment have been developed by the courts in respect of most of the varieties of
intellectual property. See, e.g., Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 597–98 (1911) (trademark); Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 16 (1829) (patent); National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 598
(2d Cir. 1951) (copyright).
67

68

See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012); see also infra note 98 and accompanying text.

This is so, at least, with respect to the most common understanding of the term “public domain” as a
reference to works currently unprotected by copyright; in this limited respect (even if not in others) it does indeed
make sense to understand the public domain “as a kind of zero sum game.” Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse
on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 825 (2006) (discussing evolution in Professor David Lange’s views over the
course of his scholarship on the public domain). Enlarging our understanding of what constitutes the public domain
necessarily complicates this binary picture; for example, virtually every copyrighted work adds to the effective
public domain at least a bit by the contribution thereto of its own unprotectable elements. See supra note 62 and
authorities cited (noting the lack of copyright protection for certain elements within copyrighted works); Samuelson,
supra, at 825 & nn.207–08 (recognizing expansion of public domain by unprotectable elements of copyrighted
works).
69

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); L. Ray Patterson, What’s Wrong
with Eldred?: An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 345, 348 (2003).
70
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depends on legislative recognition,71 the creation by Congress of new exclusive copyright
rights72 necessarily withdraws from the public the ability to engage in such uses without a
license, and Congress’s extension of copyright protection to new subject matter73 likewise ends
the public’s freedom to use such works without authorization.
This inverse relationship between the scope of copyright protection and the scope of the
public domain has become ever more important precisely because copyright has grown:
copyright now covers broader subject matter, provides more types of exclusive rights, and lasts
longer than ever.74 As copyright has expanded, the domain of material available for free public
use has correspondingly shrunk. Successive restrictions on the public domain, in turn, have
sparked growing interest among copyright scholars in the purposes and functions of the public
domain.
A. The Public Domain in Copyright Discourse
An outpouring of copyright scholarship over the last generation has examined in
considerable depth the purposes served by the public domain. The overall effect has been to
relocate the public domain from the periphery of copyright policy, of interest only as an abstract
or theoretical matter, to a position much nearer its core. Without attempting to catalog this
voluminous literature in anything approaching an exhaustive scope, some of the more
compelling strands of scholarly research concerning the importance of the public domain may be
briefly summarized.
Professor Pamela Samuelson has noted that intellectual property scholars apply the label
“public domain” in a bewildering variety of ways.75 This multiplicity of understandings, she
See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (recognizing that copyright legislation “instead of
sanctioning an existing right . . . created it.”).
71

See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
formal legislative protection for authors’ rights to create derivative works in Copyright Act of 1909); Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2(3), 109 Stat. 336, 336 (1995)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012)) (creating right for public performance via digital audio transmission); Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863–76 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1201–1205 (2012)) (creating rights against circumvention of technological protection measures and alteration of
copyright management information).
72

See, e.g., Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VII, 104 Stat. 5089,
5133–34 (1990) (architectural works); Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028–29 (1980) (software).
73

See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 977–993 (1990) (tracing expansion of subject
matter coverage and exclusive rights provided under copyright statutes from 1790 to 1976 alongside judicial
doctrines that generally served to exclude portions of works from protection). On the history of legislative
expansions of the duration of copyright protection, see generally Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194–96.
74

See Samuelson, supra note 69, at 789–813 (enumerating thirteen conceptually distinct uses of the term in
intellectual property literature); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 151 fig. 1 (2003) (representing multiple common understandings of the content of
75
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argues, is valuable insofar as it permits recognition of a wider variety of social values served by
each of the different “public domains” that scholars have identified.76 The multiple uses of the
term “public domain,” however, can also cloud understanding by introducing uncertainty at just
the point where clarity is most needed: to wit, in determining whether a particular use of a
particular work poses legal risk.77 Without discounting the benefits of the broader conceptions
Professor Samuelson describes, it makes some sense to focus attention herein on the more
limited universe of works the use of which involves no risk of legal liability to the user and to
explore the benefits that have been articulated for the availability of such works.
1. As a source of the raw materials of creation
Professor Jessica Litman’s celebrated article The Public Domain78 articulates one of the
most frequently invoked justifications for defending the public domain against encroachment by
proprietary claims: namely, that the public domain supplies the reservoir of creative and
expressive materials upon which authors draw to create new works. Authorship, on this view,
does not occur ex nihilo, but rather represents an iterative, incremental exercise building upon a
shared commons of cultural antecedents.79 An author’s ability to reuse those public-domain
antecedents without legal risk, the argument goes, itself spurs the creation of new works.80
In a similar vein, Professor James Boyle rejects, as a “powerful (and historically
contingent) stereotype,” the “romantic vision of authorship, of the genius whose style forever
expresses a single unique persona.”81 The stereotype is flawed, he explains, insofar as “the
romantic vision of authorship plays down the importance of external sources by emphasizing the

the public domain in visual form). See also, e.g., Ashley Packard, Copyright Term Extensions, the Public Domain
and Intertextuality Intertwined, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 15–16 (2002).
76

See Samuelson, supra note 69, at 826–27.

This risk is heightened with respect to those uses of the term “public domain” that refer principally to the
public availability of a work rather than to its legal status, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 69, at 797–99, for users of
copyrighted works that are widely available online may be quite surprised to find themselves in legal trouble. See id.
at 831. It is partly for this reason that participants in the open-source software movement (and similar open-content
licensing movements such as Creative Commons) generally take pains to emphasize that their works are actually
copyrighted and not free for public use except upon the terms stated in the applicable licenses. See, e.g., Timothy K.
Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public,
47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 367 n.40, 370–71 (2010).
77

78

See Litman, supra note 74.

See id. at 966 (“the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination
than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea”), 1007–12.
79

80

See Armstrong, supra note 77, at 367 & n.36.

JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 56 (1996).
81
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unique genius of the author and the originality of the work.”82 A legal regime premised upon the
“romantic author” notion will tend to portray authors as deserving, and even noble, beneficiaries
of copyright’s largesse.83 Benefits given to authors, however, come at a significant, and
underappreciated, social cost: cleaving too closely to the “romantic vision,” Boyle writes,
threatens to “impede innovation and scientific progress, diminish the availability of our cultural
heritage, inhibit artistic innovation, and restrict public debate and free speech.”84 One need not
diminish the importance of individual authorial endeavor to recognize that “[t]he tendency of the
current system to undervalue the importance of the public domain can deprive the truly creative
among us of the raw material necessary to create their next transformative artifacts.”85
The view that authorship depends on a vibrant, vital public domain also was ably
summarized by Judge Kozinski in White v. Samsung Electronics America Inc.:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.
Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today,
likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science
and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the
works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative
forces it’s supposed to nurture.86
Judge Posner agreed, writing recently in Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., that:
[E]xtending copyright protection is a two-edged sword from the
standpoint of inducing creativity, as it would reduce the incentive of
subsequent authors to create derivative works (such as new versions of
popular fictional characters like Holmes and Watson) by shrinking the
public domain. For the longer the copyright term is, the less publicdomain material there will be and so the greater will be the cost of
authorship, because authors will have to obtain licenses from copyright
holders for more material[.]87
This view of the importance of the public domain carries particular force because of its
clear linkage to copyright law’s fundamental objective: to promote the creation and
82

Id. at 114.

83

See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).

84

BOYLE, supra note 81, at 125.

85

Id. at 165.

86

989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

755 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2014); see also id. (“The smaller the public domain, the more work is involved
in the creation of a new work. The defendant’s proposed rule would also encourage authors to continue to write
stories involving old characters in an effort to prolong copyright protection, rather than encouraging them to create
stories with entirely new characters. The effect would be to discourage creativity.”).
87
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dissemination of expressive works. If Professors Litman and Boyle, and Judges Kozinski and
Posner, are correct that fostering new creative expression depends on the abundance and
accessibility of works in the public domain, then protecting the public domain against proprietary
encroachment is an essential step in advancing copyright law’s ultimate ends.
2. As a guarantor of free expression
Closely aligned with the preceding view is a related argument. If the public domain
fosters the creation of new expressive works, then protecting the public domain serves not only
the traditional interest of copyright law, but also promotes constitutional free speech. Professor
Yochai Benkler writes that treating expressive material as a form of property carries an inherent
risk of chilling expression, because we are habituated by long experience to thinking of property
as something whose distribution can be controlled (or even prevented entirely) by its owner, a
concept difficult to square with First Amendment principles.88 Recognizing a form of property
right in expressive material, as copyright does, is not the same as recognizing property rights in
real estate or corporate stock. As Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel notes: “Unlike most property
rights, copyright law is fundamentally an instrument of media and communications policy and an
integral part of our system of free expression.”89
The Supreme Court has expressed inconsistent views on the relationship between
copyright and First Amendment interests. The fault partly lies in a temporal confusion about just
whose speech is affected by the operation of the law. If one begins by assuming that more speech
is generally preferable to less speech,90 then that policy that promotes speech the most while
interfering with speech the least is best. Yet, copyright law both rewards and punishes speech.91
Consider two speakers, “A” and “B.” A’s speech occurs first in time and is thereafter quoted and
criticized by B. If the promise of remuneration led A to speak when she would otherwise have
remained silent, then copyright has served First Amendment interests; it is surely something like
this that the Court had in mind when it wrote that “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the
See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 74 NYU L. REV. 354, 356 (1999) (“Expecting information to be owned, and to be controlled by its
owner, blinds us to the cost that this property system imposes on our freedom to speak.”).
88

NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 38 (2008). For a sustained argument for substantially
curtailing intellectual property rights in expressive material because of the conflict thereby created with expressive
interests, see DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN
ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009).
89

See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled
with freedom.”) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012)
(“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”).
90

See NETANEL, supra note 89, at 37 (“Copyright both fosters original expression and impedes uses of
existing expression.”).
91
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engine of free expression.”92 A’s copyright, however, can prevent B’s speech from occurring,
curtailing rather than fostering expression.93 Concern with the restrictive effect of an earlier
speaker’s copyright on a later speaker’s expression led the Court to declare that copyright’s
limitations, including the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, constituted the
law’s “built-in First Amendment accommodations.”94 The Court’s most recent foray into the
relationship between copyright and free speech principles, Golan v. Holder, will be taken up
below; the point for present purposes is simply to emphasize that the contours of the public
domain are consequential for reasons of constitutional magnitude, not merely because the public
domain provides the raw materials for the creation of new copyrightable expressive works.
3. As a repository of scientific truth
A third benefit flowing from the existence of a robust public domain has to do with its
status as a repository of human knowledge and scientific truth, irrespective of whether those
materials are used to create additional expressive works. The constitutional referent here lies not
in the First Amendment, but the Progress (or Intellectual Property) Clause, which empowers
Congress to grant “exclusive rights” to “authors” in order “to promote the progress of science.”95
Scientific inquiry depends upon processes, such as broad dissemination of research materials for
purposes such as peer review and testing the reproducibility of results, that stand in tension with
strong claims of proprietary ownership.96 Fulfilling the constitutional purpose of “promoting
progress,” therefore, requires us to preserve a zone of basic information that remains available
for free and legally unencumbered discussion, sharing, and analysis.
So central to copyright’s purpose is the conception of the public domain as a repository
of scientific and factual knowledge that the principle receives overlapping protection from many
directions and multiple doctrines at once. Indeed, the Copyright Act itself, which has relatively

92

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).

See John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 245 (2015) (cataloging multiple uses of
copyright to suppress expression); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (expressing concern that courts in copyright cases, applying
the mechanism of injunctive relief, may effectively impose prior restraints on speech without conducting any First
Amendment analysis).
93

94

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). See generally infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution’s phraseology should be understood in contemporary usage
as meaning something akin to the “advancement of knowledge” or the “promotion of learning.” Cf., e.g., Pierre N.
Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2002).
95

See, e.g., Christopher M. Kelty, Free Software/Free Science, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 2001) (citing Robert K.
Merton’s sociological norms of scientific endeavor that treat “ideas, formulae, data, or results” as essentially a form
of common property), available at http://perma.cc/AAJ7-KLU5; Mario Biagioli, Rights or Rewards?: Changing
Contexts and Definitions of Scientific Authorship, 27 J. COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY L. 83, 84 (2000).
96
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little to say about the importance of fostering creative reuses of other authors’ expression,97
delimits the fact-oriented public domain in express terms, declaring “any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” to be unprotected by the
copyright of the work in which it appears.98
Although the roots of the fact-oriented public domain extend as far back as the Supreme
Court’s 1879 decision in Baker v. Selden, which held that the copyright in plaintiff’s accounting
book was not infringed by defendant’s description of a similar system of accounting in his own
book,99 the Court considered the policy behind excluding factual matter from copyright in
considerably greater depth in its more recent decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.100 There, the Court explained:
[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is
one between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its
existence. . . . Census takers, for example, do not “create” the population
figures that emerge from their efforts; in a sense, they copy these figures
from the world around them. Census data therefore do not trigger
copyright because these data are not “original” in the constitutional sense.
The same is true of all facts—scientific, historical, biographical, and news
of the day. “[T]hey may not be copyrighted and are part of the public
domain available to every person.”101
Consistently with this view, the Court has also invoked the need for free-ranging scientific
inquiry as a basis for limiting the scope of patent protection.102
The statutory recognition of the fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), probably represents the closest
thing to a legislative recognition of the justifications offered for the public domain in the first two subparts of the
present discussion—and even there, the provision takes the form of an affirmative defense to liability rather than a
legislative declaration that some material is outside the scope of copyright protection in the first instance.
97

98

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).

99

101 U.S. 99 (1879).

100

499 U.S. 340 (1991).

101

Id. at 347–48 (citations omitted).

See, e.g., Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989) (“concepts within the
public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all” and “provide
the baseline of free competition upon which the patent system’s incentive to creative effort depends”). The Court’s
recent decisions denying patent eligibility to what it perceived as basic research tools or the raw materials of
scientific inquiry represent further expressions of this principle. See Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012); cf. Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (recognizing that patents “can discourage research by impeding the free
exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by
102
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Copyright law’s merger doctrine creates a further buffer zone around factual and
scientific knowledge to prevent the free reuse of such knowledge from being encumbered by
proprietary claims. The merger rule, as commonly understood, denies copyright protection not
only to raw factual information itself, but also to expression necessary to communicate that
information.103 In sum, an appreciation of the public domain’s value as a repository of scientific
and factual knowledge, and recognition that the advancement of learning depends to some degree
on such knowledge remaining lawfully free to reuse and distribute, has produced a wide variety
of particular legal rules that serve, individually and in the aggregate, to preserve the public
domain against encroaching proprietization.
4. As a disciplining mechanism for licensing markets
A further benefit to the wide availability of expressive content in the public domain lies
in its effects upon licensing transactions for non-public-domain works. Copyright owners asked
to license their work for expressive reuse may be deterred from asking too high a price if a
tolerably close substitute for their work is available in the public domain. The availability of
similar (and freely reusable) expressive content in the public domain gives later creators an
alternative to negotiating with earlier creators for a license, and the existence of this alternative
may deter earlier creators from demanding excessive compensation for reuse of their works.
An example may illuminate the basic point. An author who wishes to borrow from West
Side Story to craft her own tale of star-crossed lovers must expect to pay for the rights to do so,
because West Side Story is under copyright. If the owners of West Side Story’s copyright demand
a fee higher than she is willing to pay, they will reach no agreement.104 But West Side Story’s

leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex
licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.”).
See, e.g., Kregos v. AP, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (“even expression is not protected in those
instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would
effectively accord protection to the idea itself”); Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d
600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Some ideas admit of only a limited number of expressions. When there is essentially only
one way to express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that
expression.”).
103

This risk is substantial. See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Applied welfare economics, in A HANDBOOK OF
CULTURAL ECONOMICS 20, 28 (Ruth Towse, ed., 2003) (“Prohibitively high licensing fees are equivalent to outright
refusal to license to anyone”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 95–99 (2004) (recounting one such incident). Transaction
costs, too, may prevent bargaining even where the parties may be able to agree on a reasonable license value. See
Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 326 (2005). The well-known “orphan works” problem illustrates the
problem of transaction costs and presents another scenario in which the cost of identifying the proper licensor may
exceed the value to be derived from entering into a license. See, e.g., Cecil C. Kuhne, III, The Steadily Shrinking
Public Domain: Inefficiencies of Existing Copyright Law in the Modern Technology Age, 50 LOY. L. REV. 549, 558–
59 (2004); M. William Krasilovsky, Observations on the Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 205,
104

http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/1

20

Armstrong: Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain

owners may be deterred from demanding an exorbitantly high fee by the knowledge that, if the
parties cannot agree on licensing terms, the would-be author may draw similar content from
Romeo and Juliet, which is in the public domain (and from which West Side Story itself drew).105
The point is perhaps a small one and should not be overstated, but in essence, the public domain
provides an alternative pool of expressive content the availability of which discourages copyright
holders from demanding excessive licensing fees and thereby facilitates at least some
transactions that would not otherwise occur.106 This suggests that the public domain should be
valued not only for its own sake, but for the constraining force it exerts on copyright owners in
licensing negotiations and for its resulting encouragement of mutually advantageous bargaining
over reuse of expressive works.
B. Policy Implications of Copyright Scholarship on the Public Domain
The preceding discussion provides an assortment of rationales collectively suggesting
that the public domain needs a relatively robust level of legal protection against encroachment by
proprietary claims. A well-developed corpus of legal scholarship on the public domain, however,
suggests that current United States copyright law undervalues and underprotects the public
domain, thereby disserving interests of both statutory and constitutional magnitude. Public
domain scholarship calls attention to the “costs” side of copyright’s ledger of costs and benefits.
In so doing, this scholarship highlights the difficulties that follow from treating copyright as a
matter of right (rather than of legislative grace) for authors and from maintaining an overromanticized image of authorial endeavor. If the romantic, moralistic view of authorship suggests
that copyright rights cannot be made too strong or too lengthy in duration, public domain
scholarship supplies an important corrective: just because some level of copyright protection is
good, it does not follow that a higher level of protection is necessarily better, for every alteration
in the balance comes at a cost to someone. Giving more rewards to yesterday’s authors penalizes
tomorrow’s, whose costs to create will rise and whose incentives to create may correspondingly
diminish, resulting in a contraction (rather than an expansion) of expressive output. Professor
Yochai Benkler summarized this basic insight:
Today’s users of information are not only today’s readers and consumers.
They are also today’s producers and tomorrow’s innovators. Their net
212 (1967) (“Imagine the block on cultural development if the heirs of Shakespeare or Beethoven would have to be
located to grant licenses.”).
105

Cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 64, at 67–68 (cataloging illustrations of expressive borrowing).

By focusing in this portion of the essay on the public domain’s impact on copyright licensing, I make no
normative claims about the primacy of licensing transactions as a preferred means of fostering expressive activity.
Cf., e.g., Molly Shaeffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1565–66 (2005)
(questioning overly rosy descriptions of licensing markets in copyright case law and scholarship). In particular, the
Supreme Court’s view that private licensing transactions represent a constitutionally adequate replacement for the
free availability of public domain information seems entirely misguided. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
106
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benefit from a strengthened patent or copyright regime, given not only
increased potential revenues but also the increased costs, may be negative.
If we pass a law that regulates information production too strictly,
allowing its beneficiaries to impose prices that are too high on today’s
innovators, then we will have not only too little consumption of
information today, but also too little production of new information for
tomorrow.107
Maintaining (or, in most scholars’ view, establishing) the optimal balance between the
interests of copyright holders in their works and the broader public’s interest in the public
domain would entail substantial alterations to current law. Scholars have proposed a wide
assortment of alterations to current law to account better for the importance of the public domain.
One family of proposals seeks to protect the public domain against proprietary encroachment: if
the public domain is itself a form of property held in common, then perhaps its borders should be
clearly staked and marked,108 and parties who wrongly assert individual ownership of any
portion of the commons should be penalized.109 It should be easy for authors who wish to place
their works into the public domain to do so,110 and the public should be entitled permanently to
rely on the public-domain status of a work.111 Other proposals, seeking to foster creative
repurposing (not mere copying) of expressive material, would withdraw from copyright holders
the power to control noncommercial exploitation112 or the exclusive right to create derivative
works.113 A more significant transformation would result under proposals to restore some formal

YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM 38 (2006).
107

See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 (2009); David Lange,
Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 176–77 (1981) (suggesting that recognition of
any claim of proprietary ownership should be accompanied by express terms setting the outer limits of the grant).
108

See JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 8 (2011)
(proposing new scheme of civil liability to deter false claims of proprietary ownership of public-domain materials).
109

See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1175, 1227–28 (2010).
110

Compare id. with infra notes 284–286 and accompanying text. See also Armstrong, supra note 77, at 409–
10 (arguing that authors’ express dedications to the public domain may nevertheless be revocable under current law);
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1121, 1149 (2003) (questioning whether existing law provides any enforceable mechanism for a
permanent dedication of an author’s work to the public domain).
111

112

See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 41–45 (2010).

113

See Derek Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345

(2008).
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requirements for copyright protection, such as registration and renewal114—requirements that
may contravene the United States’ treaty commitments,115 at least as they now exist.116 Finally,
and perhaps most dramatically, the open-source software phenomenon (and the movement for
open content more generally, illustrated by the work of the Creative Commons organization)
represent efforts to leverage contract and copyright principles to erect what is in essence a second
“quasi-public” domain consisting of works that may freely be reused and repurposed provided a
set of (comparatively lenient) license conditions are met.117
Copyright law today thus stands roughly where antitrust law stood in the late 1970s.
Antitrust scholars of that era saw a body of law that they believed had grown ossified and
disserved consumer interests. Today’s copyright scholars see a body of law that increases the
costs of creating expressive works and fits poorly with the realities of the modern information
economy. The policy changes that antitrust underwent during the last three decades, however, so
far have no parallel in copyright law.

See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003). See generally Symposium,
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright for the Internet Age, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1415 (2013).
114

See Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 5(2), opened for signature Sept. 9,
1886, 6 U.S.T. 2731 (“[t]he enjoyment and exercise of [copyright] rights shall not be subject to any formality”)
[hereafter “Berne Convention”]. A creative attempt to reconcile the Berne Convention’s prohibition on formalities
with a renewed registration requirement is articulated in Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright Duration and the Progressive
Degeneration of a Constitutional Doctrine, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 189 (2005), which would make copyright
protection beyond the life-plus-50 term mandated by Art. 7(1) of the Berne Convention contingent upon registration
of copyright in the work.
115

The size of its economy confers on the United States a measure of bargaining power in international
negotiations over intellectual property matters, at least vis-à-vis smaller economic actors. For example, the United
States has been successful in insisting that smaller trading partners strengthen intellectual property protections as a
condition for entering into free trade agreements with the U.S. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough:
Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011); Carsten Fink & Patrick
Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: Intellectual Property Provisions of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, in TRADE, DOHA,
AND DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE ISSUES 289 (Richard Newfarmer, ed., 2006); Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus
Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215 (Lorand
Bartels & Federico Ortino, eds., 2006). These examples provide at least some reason to believe that, were the United
States to adopt new formal requirements for securing or maintaining copyright protection, it would be possible to
alter the United States’ international commitments to make such formal requirements lawful. Indeed, the more likely
course may be to secure international agreement first, then adopt implementing legislation in the United States as
occurred in the case of the DMCA. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 122–45 (2001). On the other hand,
amending international treaties to permit formal conditions on copyright protection would require the assent of
larger world economies as well, who may have less reason to acquiesce to pressure from the United States; indeed, it
was international dislike of then-existing U.S. copyright formalities that partly led to the enactment of the URAA
statute discussed below. See infra notes 222–238 and accompanying text.
116

117

See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004).
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IV.

Solicitude for the Public Domain in Copyright Cases and Policy

A. Limiting the Public Domain
A colleague once asked Professor Jonathan Zittrain, “why [do] all the cyberprofs hate
copyright?”118 Although “hate” is probably the wrong word, he replied, it was certainly true that
“[a]lmost all of us who study and write about the law of cyberspace agree that copyright law is a
big mess.”119 Indeed, observations about the overwhelmingly critical state of copyright
scholarship have themselves become a sort of meta-component of academic discourse.120
Although the law has defenders who have occasionally expressed dismay at the critical
barrage,121 and some parts of the law undoubtedly enjoy greater popularity than others,122 the
overall tone of scholarly commentary on copyright law has a distinctly critical flavor.
Outside the academic community, however, matters generally are different. Some of this
surely reflects simple economics; the business world promises great fortunes to be made in
creating and defending intellectual property,123 whereas the broader social stake in the public
domain may be too attenuated to attract comparable legal resources.124 Nevertheless, scholarship
118

Jonathan Zittrain, The Copyright Cage, LEGAL AFFAIRS (July/Aug. 2003), http://perma.cc/9DZN-XDP3.

119

Id.

See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, This American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-equilibrating Copyright for the
Internet Age, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2347674 (Oct. 30, 2013), manuscript at 4 (“at no time in …
copyright law’s 300 year history, has the copyright system been more severely criticized as being out of touch and
out of date”); Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740, 740 (2013) (“Copyright
law has taken quite a beating in the legal literature in the past decade or so.”); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation:
Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 537 & n.1.
120

See, e.g., Merges, supra note 117, at 183 n.1; Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 1 (1997) (“For one drawn to copyright both for its intellectual fascination and its
inspiring goals of fostering creativity and protecting authorship, I am distressed to learn that I am among the
defenders of a fallen faith”).
121

I am unaware, for example, of any substantial disagreement over copyright’s core principle that authors
should be empowered to prevent unauthorized, nontransformative commercial duplication of their works. On the
other hand, scholarly commentary on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act certainly resembles Judge Bork’s
“cascade of vituperation.” See supra note 1.
122

See, e.g., Kevin G. Rivette et al., Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan./Feb. 2000, at 54.
123

As others have recognized, a basic collective action problem exists whenever economic rights in a
particular piece of property come into conflict with the interests of the broader public, for the public’s interest is
unlikely to be directly represented in any individual case—or may be represented, at best, only by proxy, to the
extent that the interests of a party opposing the assertion of exclusive rights may resemble the interests of the public.
See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 64, at 241 (noting that one problem with preserving the public domain is that rights
holders’ interests are concentrated and tangible, while the public’s interest is more diffuse). For examples of
organizations and individuals working to overcome the collective action dilemma, see id. at 243–44; Peter Goodrich,
Sonia K. Katyal, & Rebecca Tushnet, Panel I: Critical Legal Studies in Intellectual Property and Information Law
124
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tending to support significant limits on copyright is broadly available for use by advocates in
real-world cases and surely is known to the courts. Unlike in antitrust law, however, where
hostile scholarly commentary produced substantial changes in legal doctrine, in intellectual
property, “this outpouring of scholarship has been notably unsuccessful in winning judicial
converts.”125 The point may be illustrated by considering a few cases in which the interests of
copyright holders have come into conflict with the principle that a strong and vibrant public
domain deserves protection against proprietary encroachment. This section considers three such
cases: the Supreme Court’s decisions in Eldred v. Ashcroft126 and Golan v. Holder,127 and the
Ninth Circuit’s intervening decision in Kahle v.Gonzales.128 The cases will be discussed
chronologically.
1. Eldred v. Ashcroft
In the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”),129 Congress extended by
20 years the duration of all copyrights then in force. For works published and copyrighted before
January 1, 1978, the statute lengthened the second term of protection that all works were
potentially eligible to receive from 47 to 67 years (while leaving the first term of 28 years
unaltered, thus increasing the total duration of copyright for such works from 75 to 95 years).130
For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the statute extended the duration of copyright
from 50 to 70 years after the death of the author (or last surviving co-author) of the work.131
By extending the duration of copyright protection, the CTEA blocked the entry of
existing works into the public domain. The works most immediately affected were those
Scholarship, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601, 607–10 (2013) (comments of Rebecca Tushnet); Victoria Smith
Ekstrand, Andrew Famiglietti, & Suzanne V.L. Berg, Birthing “CLA”: Critical Legal Activism, the IP Wars and
Forking the Law, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 663, 675–81 (2013).
Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169, 1171
(2007). The quotation refers specifically to scholarship on copyright and the First Amendment, but the basic point
applies quite a bit more generally than that context may suggest. For thoughts along similar lines, see, e.g., Jennifer
E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 464 (2010) (“Even
though there have been ever-increasing calls by intellectual property (IP) scholars for greater First Amendment
scrutiny in copyright cases, there has been a virtually unrelenting rejection of First Amendment review in copyright
cases.”); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993) (“Lawyers, law professors, and even judges are on record
pleading for the law to subject intellectual property to the same free speech principles that limit other assertions of
governmental power. … But the courts have too often turned a deaf ear to these arguments.”).
125

126

537 U.S. 186 (2003).

127

132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).

128

487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007).

129

Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).

130

Id. § 102(d), 112 Stat. at 2827–28 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 304).

131

Id. § 102(b), 112 Stat. at 2827 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 302).
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published beginning in the year 1923. Before the CTEA, works copyrighted in 1923 would have
enjoyed an initial term of copyright protection of 28 years (until the end of 1951), followed by a
renewal term of 47 years (until the end of 1998) and would thereafter have entered the public
domain. By lengthening the second copyright term to 67 years, however, the CTEA kept those
works out of the public domain until the end of 2018 (assuming Congress enacts no further
legislative extensions). The same is necessarily true of all copyrighted works published more
recently than 1923: works published in 1924 (and validly renewed) will now enter the public
domain at the end of 2019 rather than 1999; those published in 1925 in 2020 rather than 2000;
and so forth. The effect of the CTEA was to put a 20-year moratorium on the entry of
copyrighted works into the public domain, although the statute did not restore protection to any
works whose copyrights had previously expired.132
Copyright and constitutional law scholars roundly criticized the statute.133 Although no
one doubted that Congress generally possessed the power to fix the duration of copyright
rights,134 its exercise of that power retroactively to extend the duration of copyright in preexisting works struck many observers as problematic. The basic argument concerned incentives
to create: An author considering today whether to create a work might be moved to do so by
Congress’s promise that the author’s copyright protection would endure for a longer period, but
such a calculus could not possibly matter to authors who had already created their works at the

Thus, works published under copyright in 1922 or earlier remained in the public domain in the United
States notwithstanding the CTEA. (Using the 28-year first term followed by 47-year second term framework,
copyright in a 1922 work would have expired December 31, 1997.)
132

See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1, 70–74 (2001); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical
Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19 (2001); Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, The Proper Scope
of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000); Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the
Goals of Copyright: Property Rights or Cultural Progress, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 132–35 (1998)
(discerning trend in recent copyright legislation to provide greater private rights without corresponding public
benefit); William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 907, 923–33 (1997) (discussing predecessor legislative proposals that ultimately became the CTEA). See also
Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1 (2002) (most, but not all, contributions by academic contributors to the Symposium conclude that the
CTEA’s constitutionality is doubtful, while contributions by private attorneys representing large media
organizations praise the statute); Symposium, An Evaluation of the Copyright Extension Act of 1995, 14 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625 (1996) (mini-symposium of three articles, each of which finds problematic the then-pending
legislative precursors to the CTEA). See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual
Property After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 547, 548–49 n.6 (2003) (cataloging scholars’
views).
133

The language of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which empowers Congress “to promote the progress of
science . . . by securing for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their . . . writings” (emphasis added),
necessarily implies that Congress may fix some “limited times” for which the rights created in the exercise of this
power endure.
134
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time the CTEA was passed, particularly if those authors were already deceased.135 Because
enlarging past copyrights could do nothing to spur the creation of new works, the retroactive
extension of existing copyrights struck many observers as a simple giveaway to publishers and
media companies at the expense of the public.136 Others feared that keeping works that had been
about to become freely available for public use under copyright protection for two more decades
would impair free expression.137
Publisher Eric Eldred filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the CTEA. He
argued that the statute contravened both the protections of the First Amendment (by forbidding
expressive reuse of materials that would otherwise have been part of the public domain) and the
“limited times” requirement of the Constitution’s intellectual property clause (by extending the
duration of past copyrights). A district court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,138 and a
divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed.139 With respect to the “limited times” requirement,
the panel majority suggested that this language forbade only copyrights that were literally
unending,140 and rejected Eldred’s argument that the Constitutional directive to “promote
progress” circumscribed legislative authority.141 The panel further concluded that the
135

See, e.g., Patry, supra note 133, at 915 (“obviously no further works can be induced”).

See Arlen W. Langvardt & Kyle T. Langvardt, Unwise or Unconstitutional?: The Copyright Term Extension
Act, the Eldred Decision, and the Freezing of the Public Domain for Private Benefit, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV.
193, 201–03 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 128 (2002) (“the CTEA looks like a massive giveaway of public domain resources for
private use”) (footnote omitted); Netanel, supra note 133, at 70 (finding that CTEA gave publishers a “double
windfall of an additional twenty years of copyright protection and, in many cases, of having acquired valuable
copyrights for prices that did not reflect the subsequently extended term”); Patry, supra note 133, at 932–33
(identifying beneficiaries of term extension as distributors and estates of deceased authors). Cf. Golan v. Holder, 132
S. Ct. 873, 907 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“when a copyright law is primarily backward looking the risk is
greater that Congress is trying to help known beneficiaries at the expense of badly organized unknown users who
find it difficult to argue and present their case to Congress”).
136

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protection and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright
Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 8, 95–97 (2002); Netanel, supra note 133, at 73.
137

138

Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).

139

Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Id. at 377 (“If the Congress were to make copyright protection permanent, then it would surely exceed the
power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause.”).
140

See id. at 377–78. This portion of the majority’s argument drew a strong dissenting opinion from Judge
Sentelle, who maintained that the language of the Constitution
141

empowers the Congress to do one thing, and one thing only. That one thing is “to
promote the progress of science and useful arts.” . . . The clause is not an open grant of
power to secure exclusive rights. . . .
. . . Extending existing copyrights is not promoting useful arts, nor is it securing
exclusivity for a limited time.
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constitutional requirement of expressive originality enunciated by the Supreme Court in Feist
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.142 applied only to the threshold question of
copyrightability vel non, and did not impose a further requirement that the author produce
additional original expression to justify enlarging the term of an existing copyright. 143 As to the
free speech issue, the panel unanimously agreed that “copyrights are categorically immune from
challenges under the First Amendment.”144
By a 7–2 vote, the Supreme Court found the CTEA constitutional and affirmed the Court
of Appeals’ decision.145 The majority first noted that Congress had on many prior occasions
extended the duration of copyrights then in force, although the question whether such extensions
complied with constitutional standards had not previously been litigated.146 Lacking relevant
precedent in the domain of copyright law, the majority turned instead to patent law, and declared
it relevant that “early Congresses extended the duration of numerous individual patents”147 and
that “[t]he courts saw no ‘limited times’ impediment to such extensions[.]”148 Because Congress
lawfully could enlarge the duration of an existing patent, the majority reasoned, it must hold

Id. at 381–82 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part). Copyright scholarship has tended to validate the view that the words
“to promote the progress of science” were intended as a substantive constraint on legislative power. See Dotan Oliar,
Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual
Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006); Patterson, supra note 70, at 348, 355–56; Malla Pollack, What is
Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001); but cf. Margaret Chon, Postmodern
Progress: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993) (suggesting that promotion
of “Progress” as an end in itself suffers from textual indeterminacy and is historically and culturally contingent).
142

499 U.S. 340 (1991).

143

Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 376–77.

Id. at 375. Commentators seemed particularly dismayed by the court’s pronouncement on this point. See,
e.g., Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 179 (2003) (“Categorical exemption is untenable.”); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v.
Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 227–28 (2001). For a critical
examination of the courts’ lengthy history of denying that copyright law and free expression are in any way
antagonistic, see Michael D. Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up,
43 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 233 (2003).
144

145

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).

146

Id. at 194–96, 200–02.

147

Id. at 201 (citing three such statutes enacted between 1808 and 1815).

Id. at 202. The majority placed particular emphasis on McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843),
which upheld the retroactive application of the provisions of a new statute to a patent issued before the statute was
passed. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 202–04; see also McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206 (“the powers of Congress to legislate upon the
subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there can
be no limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in
existing patents”).
148

http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/1

28

Armstrong: Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain

comparable power to enlarge the duration of existing copyrights.149 Whether Congress had
exercised that power wisely was a subject the majority declared to be essentially outside its
purview, noting that the statute “reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes”150 and
that the Court should “defer substantially to Congress”151 with respect to those judgments.
Finally, the majority rejected a number of Eldred’s arguments for a narrower reading of the
Constitution’s intellectual property clause: it declined to construe Congress’s history of repeated
enlargements of the copyright term “as a congressional attempt to evade or override the ‘limited
Times’ constraint”;152 agreed with the Court of Appeals that the constitutional requirement of
original expression need not be satisfied every time Congress altered the duration of an existing
copyright153 and that the constitutional directive to “promote Progress” did not operate as a
constraint upon legislative authority;154 and reasoned that the quid pro quo inherent in the
copyright system—an exchange of statutory exclusive rights in return for authors’ creation and
dissemination of their works—did not implicitly preclude Congress from altering the scope of
that bargain after the works were created in ways that benefited the authors concerned.155
The Court next addressed whether the CTEA impermissibly restricted speech protected
under the First Amendment. Focusing its attention not specifically on the CTEA but instead on
several broader copyright doctrines, the majority declared that “copyright law contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations” that sufficed to protect expressive reuse of copyrighted
materials.156 These “accommodations” included, first, the idea/expression dichotomy, which
excludes the ideas conveyed in any work from copyright protection and leaves them freely
available for reuse by others.157 The Court found a second “accommodation” in copyright’s fair
use doctrine, which allowed reuse of other authors’ copyrighted expression (not merely their
ideas) in some circumstances.158 The Court also noted that the CTEA itself broadened some
provisions of the statute that permitted certain unlicensed uses of copyrighted works.159 Although
149

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.

150

Id. at 205.

151

Id. at 204.

152

Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).

153

Compare id. at 211 with supra note 143 and accompanying text.

154

Compare Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211–14, with supra note 141 and accompanying text.

155

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214–15.

156

Id. at 219 (citation omitted).

Id.; cf. supra notes 62 (noting unprotectability of ideas and other non-expressive material found within
copyrighted works), 97–103 (explaining how preserving a domain free from proprietary claims advances the
constitutional objectives of copyright law) and accompanying text.
157

158

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20.

See id. at 220 (summarizing CTEA’s amendments to 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(h) & 110(5)(B)). The latter statutory
change was subsequently determined to contravene the United States’ international treaty obligations, but remains
159
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the Court rejected Eldred’s argument that the CTEA impaired free speech interests by forbidding
expressive reuse of materials that would have entered the public domain but for the statute, it
refused to exempt all copyright legislation from First Amendment scrutiny as the Court of
Appeals had done, explaining that:
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline
to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the
right to make other people’s speeches. To the extent such assertions raise
First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are
generally adequate to address them. We recognize that the D. C. Circuit
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically immune
from challenges under the First Amendment.” But when, as in this case,
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection,
further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.160
Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented. Justice Stevens challenged the majority’s reliance
on prior legislative extensions of existing patents,161 noting that the examples on which the
majority had relied were either inapposite or rested upon principles that subsequent cases had
declared to be unconstitutional.162 He further rejected the proposition that expanded copyright
protection could be justified as an incentive to encourage the restoration and preservation of
previously created works.163 Justice Stevens found that the CTEA contravened the public’s
reliance interest in free reuse of a copyrighted work following the expiration of whatever period
of protection initially induced the author to create that work, reasoning that:
The reason for increasing the inducement to create something new simply
does not apply to an already-created work. To the contrary, the equity
argument actually provides strong support for petitioners. Members of the
public were entitled to rely on a promised access to copyrighted or
on the books at the time of this writing. See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000).
160

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Cf. supra note 144 and accompanying text.

161

See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.

Justice Stevens was particularly dismissive of the majority’s reliance on a series of private laws enacted
from the late 18th to the mid-19th centuries which had retroactively extended patent protection to particular
inventions that had already fallen into the public domain, a practice he deemed incompatible with the Court’s
declaration in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966), that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of
patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available.” See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 234–35, 237–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Congress’s pattern of
enacting unconstitutional legislation, in Justice Stevens’s view, negated the ordinary presumption that the history of
legislative enactments on a given subject provide clues to the limitations on Congressional power over that subject.
See id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162

163

See id. at 239–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/1

30

Armstrong: Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain

patented works at the expiration of the terms specified when the exclusive
privileges were granted. On the other hand, authors will receive the full
benefit of the exclusive terms that were promised as an inducement to
their creativity, and have no equitable claim to increased compensation for
doing nothing more.164
Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the majority’s rationale necessarily implied that Congress
could enact the functional equivalent of a perpetual copyright through repeated retroactive
extensions of the term, an outcome he believed impossible to square both with history and with
the Constitution’s mandate that copyright protection subsist only for a “limited Time[.]”165 And
what the majority characterized as appropriate deference to legislative judgments as to the proper
duration of the copyright term, Justice Stevens instead saw as abdication of the Court’s
obligation to ensure that enacted legislation did not overstep constitutional bounds.166
Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the CTEA’s burdensome effects upon expression.
Although concerns regarding legislative incursions on free expression were more often
associated with First Amendment cases, such concerns were hardly foreign to copyright
discourse; indeed, Justice Breyer recognized, the Supreme Court itself had linked the two,
remarking that “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”167 In
Justice Breyer’s view, copyright’s central aim was to foster the dissemination and reuse of
expressive works by others in order to promote the constitutional values of “knowledge and
learning.”168 To focus merely on the rewards that copyright provided to authors was to miss the
point of the law, for “[t]he ‘reward’ is a means, not an end. …copyright statutes must serve
public, not private, ends[.]”169 Justice Breyer, accordingly, proposed to evaluate whether the
CTEA bestowed primarily private rather than public benefits, whether it risked “seriously . . .
undermin[ing]” the public’s expressive interest in knowledge and learning, and whether it
promoted other objectives relevant to the constitutional purpose.170
Justice Breyer found that copyright law burdened the public’s expressive interests in at
least two respects: by granting rewards to authors that may have been greater than necessary to
induce creation of their work, and by requiring authors’ permission (backed up, in most cases, by
164

Id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

165

See id. at 241–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

166

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. supra notes 150–151 and accompanying text.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoted in Eldred, 537 U.S. at
244 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); but cf. supra notes 157–158 and accompanying text (finding copyright exceptions, not
copyright protection itself, better indicative of the law’s “accommodations” with expressive interests).
167

168

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

169

Id. at 245, 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

170

See id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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a demand for compensation) as a condition of using the work.171 Both of these factors increased
the effective cost the public must pay to use a work, and both costs had been further increased by
the CTEA. Because the CTEA retroactively lengthened the duration of past copyrights, however,
Justice Breyer believed that the public would receive essentially nothing in exchange for the
higher costs it would have to bear to use pre-existing works during the newly extended copyright
term.172 Furthermore, the greater costs would apply not only to that subset of copyrighted works
that had continuing commercial value, but to all works. Even works of limited commercial
worth, however, might be of significant interest to historians, artists, teachers, and archivists—
groups whose uses of the works were most likely to yield broader social benefits. By raising the
cost of such socially valuable uses of older copyrighted works (including the costs of locating the
current rights holders for works created decades earlier), the CTEA significantly burdened the
public without providing an offsetting benefit.173
Although the majority downplayed the extent to which the CTEA impaired expressive
interests,174 Justice Breyer found the majority’s reasoning unpersuasive. The statutory exception
authorizing certain library copying, for example, contained so many built-in limitations and
exceptions as to be essentially meaningless.175 And the majority’s invocation of the fair use rule
and the idea/expression dichotomy, which it proffered as evidence of copyright’s compatibility
with First Amendment concerns, did nothing, in Justice Breyer’s view, to “help those who wish
to obtain from electronic databases material that is not there” due to the CTEA’s new
restrictions.176 Justice Breyer believed that, by causing “harm to efforts to preserve and to
disseminate works that were created long ago[,]”177 the CTEA impaired expressive reuses of
existing works to a far greater extent than the majority recognized.
Of course, regulations of every type impose costs and burdens on the regulated conduct.
Justice Breyer searched in vain, however, for any broader public benefit adequate to justify the
expressive burdens the CTEA created. Rejecting the argument that the CTEA provided an
incentive for the creation of future expressive works, Justice Breyer argued that “[n]o potential
171

See id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See id. at 248–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing wealth transfer effect of statute, which he predicted
would yield unearned windfalls to past creators).
172

See id. at 249–52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his opinions, Justice Breyer has mostly avoided a common
rhetorical error made by many other judges, in which the public interest is described as merely a proxy for the
interests of authors in controlling exploitation of their works. See, e.g., Sherwin Siy, Two Halves of the Copyright
Bargain: Defining the Public Interest in Copyright, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 683, 684–87 (2013) (criticizing
courts and other policy makers for conflating the two).
173

174

See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.

175

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 252 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)).

176

See id. at 253 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

177

Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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author can reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will
survive commercially long enough for the copyright extension to matter.”178 Relying on
calculations proffered by a group of economists in an amicus brief, he estimated that “a 1%
likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less
than seven cents today.”179 Justice Breyer found that the legislative record gave Congress no
basis on which to conclude that this modest additional sum would have altered the calculus
underlying any prospective author’s decision whether to create a work;180 and in any event, the
benefits were too slight and speculative to offset the CTEA’s real burdens on expression.181 He
believed that the statute’s defenders had overstated the benefits of matching the term of
copyright in the United States to that of European nations, which had enacted a life-plus-70 term
some years earlier.182 Justice Breyer rejected the argument that lengthening the copyright term
would lead publishers to continue distributing the protected works, finding it incompatible with
the constitutional purpose and unsupported by the available data.183 Finally, although recognizing
that Congress had recently employed copyright law as a tool to advance the interests of
American companies in international trade, Justice Breyer declared that he “f[ou]nd nothing in
the Copyright Clause that would authorize Congress to enhance the copyright grant’s monopoly
power, likely leading to higher prices both at home and abroad, solely in order to produce higher
foreign earnings. … The Clause seeks public, not private, benefits.”184
2. Kahle v. Gonzales
Although the result in Eldred v. Ashcroft surely disappointed advocates of robust
protections for the public domain,185 the majority opinion contained some favorable language.
Most notably, the Supreme Court, consistent with the consensus of scholarly opinion, rejected
the lower court’s holding that copyright statutes were immune from constitutional scrutiny under
the First Amendment.186 Although the Court ultimately rejected Eldred’s First Amendment-based
challenge to the CTEA, it did so on the ground that “in this case, Congress has not altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection”187—inviting the inference that if Congress did enact

178

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

179

Id. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

180

See id. at 255–57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

181

See id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

182

See id. at 257–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

183

See id. at 260–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

184

Id. at 262–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

185

See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 104, at 243–46.

186

Compare supra note 144 and accompanying text, with supra note 160 and accompanying text.

187

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
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a statute “altering” copyright’s “traditional contours,”188 First Amendment scrutiny would be
appropriate.
Kahle v. Gonzales189 involved a constitutional challenge to the 1998 CTEA190 and the
1992 Copyright Renewal Act (“CRA”),191 based upon Eldred’s First Amendment rationale. The
plaintiffs argued that both statutes dispensed with long-settled requirements that previously had
fostered the entry of copyrighted works into the public domain, thereby altering a “traditional
contour” of copyright protection. The “traditional contours” that Congress had changed were,
first, the requirement that a rights holder file a renewal application to obtain copyright protection
beyond the initial 28-year term, and second, the length of the additional term of protection
thereby acquired. Understanding why the Kahle plaintiffs regarded these statutes as changes to
copyright’s “traditional contours” requires a brief review of recent copyright history.
Congress began to convert copyright from an “opt-in” to an “opt-out” system of
protection in the Copyright Act of 1976.192 Before the 1976 Act, copyright protection extended to
a work only if that work’s author took affirmative steps to secure such protection. The
predecessor statute, the Copyright Act of 1909, conditioned federal copyright protection on the
author’s publication of the work with a valid notice of copyright.193 The default position in
copyright law thus matched that of patent law: expressive works and inventions both came into

As Professor Netanel has noted, the Eldred Court’s reference to copyright’s “traditional contours” is quite
opaque, and the Court’s opinion offered little guidance concerning how future courts or litigants could determine
whether copyright legislation violated any applicable First Amendment standards. As he put it:
188

[O]ur current Copyright Act provides for a far longer copyright term, grants copyright
protection to many more types of expressive works, imposes markedly fewer
prerequisites for enjoying copyright protection, and accords copyright holders more
exclusive rights than did U.S. copyright law through much of the nineteenth century.
Viewed in that light, very little of today’s Copyright Act would fall within copyright
law’s “traditional contours.”
Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082,
1097 (2013); cf. supra note 74 and accompanying text. For attempts to give substantive content to the Court’s
reference to “traditional contours,” see, e.g., Edward S. Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 365–68
(2008); William McGinty, First Amendment Rights to Protected Expression: What Are the Traditional Contours of
Copyright Law?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1099, 1119–27 (2008) (finding that the Court’s reference to “traditional
contours” implies a predominantly historical mode of review).
189

487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007), superseding on denial of petition for rehearing en banc 474 F.3d 665 (9th Cir.

2007).
190

See supra note 129.

191

Pub. L. No. 102-307, tit. I, 106 Stat. 264, 264 (1992) [hereafter “Copyright Renewal Act”].

192

Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C.).

193

See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075.
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being unprotected by federal law,194 and received protection only if their respective creators
followed the steps prescribed by statute to create enforceable rights. Authors could “opt in” to
copyright protection by observing the required formalities upon publication of their work;
conversely, an author’s publication of a work without complying with the applicable statutory
formalities prevented copyright rights from attaching and effectively left the work in the public
domain.195
Its historical insistence that authors comply with statutory formalities (such as a valid
notice of copyright) before protection could attach placed the United States at odds with
international copyright law, which disallowed the setting of such preconditions to copyright
protection.196 As the United States became a net exporter of intellectual property assets, however,
Congress began to perceive an advantage for domestic producers in integrating the United States
more closely into the international copyright regime.197 Many of the changes enacted in the
Copyright Act of 1976, such as the adoption of a unitary copyright term, were justified as
necessary to bring United States law into line with international copyright norms.198 In one of its
most important alterations to then-existing law, the 1976 Act redefined the moment at which
federal copyright protection attached to an expressive work: rather than requiring authors to
publish their works and to observe certain formal requirements when doing so, the new statute
provided that copyright protection attached to every work when “fixed in a tangible medium of
expression.”199 By extending copyright protection automatically to every expressive work upon
fixation, the 1976 Act effectively ended the “opt-in” federal copyright system that existed under
the 1909 Act.
Even the 1976 Act, however, still nominally required authors to include a notice of
copyright when their works were published, although the statute permitted deficient notices to be
cured during a specified period following publication.200 These remaining formal requirements

Before the 1976 Act, expressive works were protectable by state law before publication, so the
circumstances are admittedly not precisely parallel. The 1976 Act eliminated state-law systems of copyright
protection for most purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
194

195

See generally Armstrong, supra note 77, at 388–89.

196

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

For much of its early history the United States, like many other developing nations, purposefully
maintained comparatively weak protections for intellectual property rights (especially for foreign creators) as a form
of subsidy to domestic producers. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 34–35 (2000); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 21, 29–30 & n.42 (2004) (linking historical changes in United States copyright policy to interests of U.S.
producers).
197

198

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 135, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5751.

199

17 U.S.C. § 102(a).

200

See Armstrong, supra note 77, at 389 & nn.166–68.
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were swept away in 1989 under the Berne Convention Implementation Act (“BCIA”).201 The
combination of the 1976 Act’s provision recognizing copyright protection from the moment of
fixation and the BCIA’s elimination of even those weak formal requirements that survived the
1976 Act essentially completed the transformation of copyright in the United States from an
“opt-in” to an “opt-out” system of protection.202
The statutes at issue in Kahle made further alterations to the copyright system which, the
plaintiffs contended, upset its “traditional contours.” Before the Copyright Renewal Act, the
filing of a renewal application was necessary to extend the term of copyright in a pre-1978 work
beyond an initial 28-year period of protection.203 The CRA eliminated this renewal requirement
for all works that were still in their initial 28-year term of protection in 1992—which is to say,
works published under copyright between 1964 and 1977, inclusive.204 The statute’s effect on the
scope of the public domain was dramatic, because most authors never renewed their
copyrights.205 Before the CRA, failure to file a renewal application left the work in the public
domain after the initial 28-year term of protection expired.206 By making renewal automatic, the
CRA thus extended the term of copyright for that majority of works that would otherwise have
entered the public domain 28 years after publication.207 At the time of the CRA, the automatic
renewal added a further 47 years to the duration of every copyright for works published between
1964 and 1977.208

Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) [hereafter “Berne Convention Implementation Act”]. The
statute became effective March 1, 1989. See id. § 13(a) (codified at note following 17 U.S.C. § 101).
201

See Armstrong, supra note 77, at 388–90. Indeed, even the “opt out” label may no longer accurately
characterize the law, because it is uncertain under the present statutory language whether an author who wishes to
“opt out” of copyright protection may do so. See id. at 391; but cf. supra note 67 and accompanying text.
202

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (summarizing historical evolution of copyright duration
rules); Martha Graham School & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380
F.3d 624, 632–33 (1st Cir. 2004) (same).
203

Copyright Renewal Act, supra note 191, § 102(g)(2), 106 Stat. at 266 (codified at note following 17 U.S.C.
§ 101); see also Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 2007); 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:92 (2014).
204

See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 64, at 242 & fig. 8.8 (illustrating that renewal applications were filed
only for a minority of those works eligible for renewal); Sprigman, supra note 114, at 499 & fig. 3.
205

206

See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951).

207

See Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699.

See Copyright Renewal Act, supra note 191, § 102(a), 106 Stat. at 264–65 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)).
By automatically granting a 47-year renewal term to works created between 1964 and 1977 as to which no renewal
application was filed, the Copyright Renewal Act extended the duration of copyright in every such work from 28 to
a total of 75 years—effectively postponing by two generations or more the entry of such works into the public
domain.
208
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The CTEA further slowed the entry of works into the public domain by adding 20 years
to the duration of all copyrights then in force.209 Works created between 1964 and 1977, which
received a second copyright term automatically under the Copyright Renewal Act, received a
second term that was even longer than the law provided at the time the works were created. This
further restriction of copyrighted works from passing into the public domain was also the subject
of the plaintiffs’ “traditional contours” First Amendment challenge in Kahle.210
The Court of Appeals panel found the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges to both the
CRA and CTEA to be foreclosed by Eldred.211 The court’s discussion of the First Amendment
issue occupies just five paragraphs of its opinion,212 a cursory treatment that apparently rested on
the assumption that the parallels between Eldred and the plaintiffs’ CRA and CTEA challenges
were too obvious to require elaboration. That assumption may have been at least tolerably apt
with respect to the Kahle plaintiffs’ CTEA challenge; the lengthening of existing copyright terms
by 20 years survived First Amendment scrutiny in Eldred, and the same statute was at issue in
Kahle.213
With respect to the CRA challenge, however, the Kahle panel’s attempt to draw a parallel
with Eldred appears more strained. The CRA, of course, was not before the Court in Eldred. In
order to bring the CRA within the scope of the reasoning enunciated in Eldred, the Kahle panel
had to characterize the CRA as “plac[ing] existing copyrights in parity with those of future
works.”214 This characterization of the statute is not easily squared with its text, which expressly
treats some past works—those published between 1964 and 1977—differently from all others,215
209

See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text.

210

See Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699–700.

211

See id. at 698 (“The Supreme Court has already effectively addressed and denied Plaintiffs’ arguments.”).

212

See id. at 700.

See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text. Even with respect to the CTEA challenge, however, the
Kahle and Eldred cases are not perfect mirror images. Petitioners in Eldred nowhere addressed the question whether
Congress had altered a “traditional contour” of copyright protection; nor could they, for the principle that changes to
“the traditional contours of copyright protection” invite First Amendment scrutiny was coined by the Eldred
majority itself. On this view, Kahle invited the Court of Appeals to do precisely what the majority in Eldred had not:
namely, to give substantive content to the “traditional contours” test. Cf. supra note 188 and accompanying text. By
instead treating the plaintiffs’ challenge as foreclosed by Eldred, the Kahle panel bypassed an opportunity to clarify
the law.
213

Kahle, 487 F.3d at 700; cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (noting that CTEA’s blanket 20year extension of all existing copyright terms “placed existing and future copyrights in parity”); id. at 196 (“in
common with the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts, the CTEA’s new terms apply to both future and existing copyrights”).
214

See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Under the CRA, both the absolute length of the copyright term
for 1964–1977 works, as well as the way the duration is computed, differ from the corresponding rules governing
pre-1964 or post-1977 works. Pre-1978 works enjoy a fixed term of federal copyright protection measured from the
date of publication (with works published in 1963 or earlier entering the public domain if their copyrights are not
renewed after the initial 28-year term of protection), while post-1977 works enjoy a different measure of protection
215
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and which contains no provisions of relevance to future works. Perhaps Kahle’s characterization
is tolerably accurate to the extent that the CRA treated alike all works within the subset of those it
singled out for special treatment, although even this statement is, at best, an approximation in
view of other provisions of the CRA that extend greater protections to some 1964–1977 works
(those in respect of which a renewal application is filed) than to others (those whose copyrights
are automatically renewed).216 These distinctions between the claim at issue in Kahle and the
challenge resolved by the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred passed unremarked upon in the
Kahle panel’s exceedingly brief analysis.217 Although the plaintiffs’ CRA challenge in Kahle
arguably warranted closer scrutiny than the court gave it, the court’s choice to frame the
challenge as simply duplicative of the CTEA challenge rejected in Eldred effectively foreclosed
further review.218
The combined effects of the CRA and CTEA on the public domain warranted only
glancing mention in the panel’s opinion. The panel recognized the extent to which the statutes
had contributed to changing the state of play, noting that before 1978, “[t]he majority of creative
works were … never copyrighted and only a small percentage were protected for the maximum
term.”219 The panel further observed that “[e]liminating the renewal requirement dramatically
increased the average copyright term and correspondingly decreased the number of works

consisting of a certain number of years following the death of the author of the work. See supra notes 130–131 and
accompanying text. Far from treating past and present works alike, the CRA expressly preserved this disparity in the
means by which copyright terms for pre-1978 and post-1977 works are computed.
See Copyright Renewal Act, supra note 191, § 102(a), 106 Stat. at 265 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(a)(4)(A)). Although the failure to file a copyright renewal application no longer results in the work falling into
the public domain after the initial 28-year term of protection, it nevertheless has ongoing legal consequences. Under
this provision of the CRA, proprietors who fail to file a copyright renewal application may no longer complain about
licensees’ continuing exploitation of derivative works prepared during the first copyright term. In contrast,
proprietors who do file a renewal application may avail themselves of the rule of Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990), which requires the licensee to conclude a new agreement with the copyright holder in order to continue
exploiting a derivative work during the renewal term of the underlying copyright in some circumstances.
216

The extension of the total duration of copyright entailed by the CRA’s elimination of the renewal
requirement also created a quantitatively more substantial change to the total length of the copyright term than was
before the Supreme Court in Eldred. Those 1964–1977 works for which no renewal application was filed (which is
to say, the great majority of such works) saw their copyright terms nearly trebled under the CRA, from 28 to 75
years. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. This extension exceeds, in both absolute terms and as a
percentage of the unmodified original duration, the 20-year extension under the CTEA.
217

Cf. Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary First Amendment Analysis of Legislation Treating News Aggregation as
Copyright Infringement, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 947, 964 n.89 (2010) (“Kahle has relatively little to say about
when a court should apply elevated First Amendment scrutiny to copyright legislation because the Ninth Circuit saw
the case as an attempt to re-litigate Eldred. It would therefore be incorrect to read Kahle as standing for the
proposition that all First Amendment review of copyright legislation should be deferential.”).
218

219

Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699; see also supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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currently entering the public domain.”220 Nevertheless, in the panel’s view, curtailing the entry of
formerly copyrighted works into the public domain “d[id] not require further First Amendment
scrutiny” because “traditional First Amendment safeguards such as fair use and the
idea/expression dichotomy are sufficient to vindicate the speech interests affected by the CRA
and the CTEA.”221 In any event, for present purposes, the panel’s reasoning matters less than its
result: given a choice between protecting private rights and the public domain, the panel gave the
former greater weight. That is the same choice the Eldred majority made, even if the
circumstances of the two cases were not quite as similar as the Kahle panel stated.
3. Golan v. Holder
In the last half century, Congress has acted repeatedly to bring United States intellectual
property laws more into line with international treaties and norms.222 One such international
treaty, the Berne Convention, required (in Article 18(1)) that member nations extend copyright
protection “to all works which, at the moment of [the Convention’s] coming into force, have not
yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of
protection.”223 After the United States joined the Berne Convention effective March 1, 1989,224
questions arose concerning whether United States law adequately protected foreign works whose
copyrights had not yet expired in their home countries. There was reason to believe that it did
not, for some foreign authors had been determined to have no valid United States copyrights not
because the term of protection had expired in the author’s home country, but because of the
author’s failure to comply with the statutory formalities that United States law required, upon
publication, for copyright protection to attach.225 The United States Government, however, took
the position that the obligations stated in Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention were not
mandatory,226 and the 1988 legislation that implemented the Berne Convention specifically did
220

Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699.

221

Id. at 700 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20).

See supra notes 196–202 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102 to provide that United States patents shall
be awarded to the first inventor to file a patent application, the priority rule that other nations have long applied).
222

Berne Convention, supra note 115, Art. 18(1). The Convention also provides, in Article 18(2), that member
nations are not required to extend copyright protection to any work that had already entered the public domain in
that nation through expiration of the copyright term. See id. Art. 18(2).
223

224

See supra note 201 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 427 & n.4 (Cal. 1979) (noting that Bram Stoker’s
1897 novel Dracula, although validly copyrighted in the author’s home country of England until 1962 (50 years
after the author’s death), had always been in the public domain in the United States due to the author’s
noncompliance with the deposit requirement of United States copyright law).
225

H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 51 (1988) (“there is considerable debate over whether any recognition of the
‘principle’ of Article 18(1) of the Convention is absolutely required in light of the sweeping discretion accorded
states by Article 18(3)”); see also Library of Congress, Copyright Office, Final Regulation, Restoration of Certain
226
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not extend copyright protection to “any work that is in the public domain in the United
States.”227 The nation’s failure to extend copyright protection to all foreign authors whose works
remained under copyright in their home countries was a source of lingering tension in the United
States’ relations with its trading partners.228
The completion of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations229 in 1994
brought a commitment by the United States to several new treaties. Most prominent for present
purposes was the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”), which for the first time brought the rules of intellectual property under the umbrella
of the global trade system.230 Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provided, in part, that
“[m]ember nations shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and
the Appendix thereto.”231 This language raised renewed questions about the United States’
adherence to Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention and its mandate to extend copyright
protection to works of foreign authors whose copyrights in their home countries had not yet
expired. Abandoning the pretense that such provisions were merely optional, the United States
moved swiftly to amend its copyright statutes to bring itself more fully into compliance with the
Berne Convention.
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”)232 amended the copyright
statute to provide for the “restoration” of United States copyright protection in foreign works that
had previously lost United States copyright protection for specified reasons other than the
expiration of copyright in the author’s home country. Specifically, the statute identified as
eligible for restoration of United States copyright protection those works of foreign authors that
were in the public domain due to noncompliance with formalities, failure to renew, lack of
proper copyright notice, failure to observe manufacturing requirements, lack of subject matter
Berne and WTO Works, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,414, 50,416 (Sept. 29, 1995) (“The United States arguably failed to
conform its law fully to the Berne Convention in 1989 when it declined to interpret Article 18(1) on restoration as
being mandatory.”) (footnote omitted).
See Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 201, § 12, 102 Stat. at 2860 (codified at note
following 17 U.S.C. § 101).
227

See, e.g., Thomas Gordon Kennedy, Note, GATT-Out of the Public Domain: Constitutional Dimensions of
Foreign Copyright Restoration, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 545, 553–54 (1996); Paul J. Sleven & Eric J.
Weisberg, GATT Implementation Bill Restores Copyright in Foreign Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 272,
272–73 (1995).
228

229

See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND

(1996).
An overview of the TRIPS Agreement is available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (visited May 1, 2014). The text of the agreement
is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereafter “TRIPS Agreement”].
230

231

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 230, Art. 9(1).

232

Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012)).
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protection (only with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings), or lack of national eligibility.233 The
statute specifically denied restoration of United States copyright protection to any foreign work
that was “in the public domain in its source country through expiration of term of
protection[.]”234 Those foreign works which qualified for restoration of copyright protection
received a new United States copyright beginning (in general) on January 1, 1996,235 and
thereafter “subsist[ing] for the remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have
otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entered the public domain in the
United States.”236 In recognition of the fact that some United States users of foreign copyrighted
works may have relied to their detriment on the fact that those works were in the public domain
in the United States, the URAA shielded such users from liability for copyright infringement if
they discontinued any infringing activity within twelve months after the publication of a notice
by the foreign author of a restored work that the author intended to enforce her copyright. 237 The
URAA also created a compulsory license scheme permitting derivative works based upon any
foreign restored work to continue to be exploited so long as “reasonable compensation” was paid
to the foreign author.238 Neither URAA provision aimed ostensibly at protecting parties who had
relied on the public domain status of restored works, however, permitted continued use of such
works without the payment of a royalty.
Because the URAA effectively removed expressive works from the public domain and
forbid them to be used without payment to a private party, it raised substantial questions
concerning legislative power. Indeed, in Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court had
suggested that any law diminishing the public domain would exceed the bounds of
Congressional power under the Constitution’s Progress Clause. There, the Court wrote:
[T]he federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision
. . . which authorizes the Congress “To promote the Progress of . . . useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of power
and a limitation . . . . The Congress in the exercise of the patent power
233

17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C) (2012) (defining “restored work”).

234

Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B) (emphasis added).

See id. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (“Copyright subsists, in accordance with this section, in restored works, and vests
automatically on the date of restoration.”), (h)(2) (defining “date of restoration” as January 1, 1996, if the foreign
author’s home country was on that date a party to the Berne Convention or a member country of the WTO; or as a
later date when either of those conditions became effective with respect to the author’s home country). Section
104A(g) empowered the President of the United States to declare that particular foreign countries had become
eligible for restoration of their authors’ copyrights in the United States.
235

236

Id. § 104A(a)(1)(B).

237

Id. § 104A(d)(2), (e).

Id. § 104A(d)(3). See generally Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 554–55 (3d
Cir. 2002) (explaining operation of URAA’s provisions on restoration of copyright in foreign works).
238
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may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover,
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in
a patent system which by constitutional command must “promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts.” This is the standard expressed in the
Constitution and it may not be ignored.239
This suggestion that the borders of the public domain are guarded by interests of constitutional
magnitude could have been read to suggest a basis for striking down Section 514 of the URAA,
insofar as that statute expressly extended copyright protection to works that had for many years
been in the public domain in the United States (although copyrighted elsewhere).
A group of plaintiffs who contended that their livelihoods depended upon continued free
use of foreign restored works filed a lawsuit challenging Section 514 on constitutional grounds.
Upholding the statute, a district court determined that the above-quoted language from Graham
v. John Deere was irrelevant where Congress removed copyrightable expression, rather than
patentable knowledge, from the public domain, and where Congress had previously sought to
close perceived gaps in federal copyright protection after the fact.240 The court also rejected
plaintiffs’ contention that Section 514 unconstitutionally burdened free expression, although it
did so essentially without analysis, simply declaring it to be a “settled rule that private censorship
via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns.”241
A court of appeals panel reversed and remanded, finding that the URAA presented
troubling First Amendment issues that could not be dismissed as easily as the district court
suggested.242 Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred, the panel reasoned that copyright
legislation invites First Amendment scrutiny if it “altered the traditional contours of copyright

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (footnote omitted, first emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“that which is in the public domain cannot be removed
therefrom by action of the States”). This is the principle, recall, that Justice Stevens deemed incompatible with the
majority’s reasoning in Eldred. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
239

Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 914754, **5, 14 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005) (“On the whole, Congress has
historically demonstrated little compunction about removing copyrightable materials from the public domain.”).
240

Id. at *17 (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Curiously, the district court’s opinion
took no account of the fact that the Supreme Court had expressly disapproved of Eldred v. Reno on this very point.
See supra notes 144, 160 and accompanying text.
241

242

Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
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protection.”243 In contrast to the Kahle panel, the Golan panel sought to give substantive content
to the “traditional contours” test. The panel reasoned that the reference to “tradition” suggested
that “Congress’s historical practice with respect to copyright and the public domain must inform
our inquiry.”244 That historical practice, in the panel’s view, revealed a consistent “copyright
sequence” recognized by every statute prior to the URAA: “[a] work progressed from 1)
creation, 2) to copyright, 3) to the public domain.”245 By reversing the second and third steps, the
panel believed, the URAA altered the “bedrock principle . . . that works in the public domain
remain there[.]”246 The panel supported its historical understanding of the traditional copyright
sequence by referring to many cases standing for the general proposition that copyright
protection cannot extend to material in the public domain.247 Turning next to the history of the
copyright statutes, the panel found therein no evidence of a “tradition of removing works from
the public domain.”248 The historical record surrounding the Copyright Act of 1790 was too
muddled to support definitive conclusions one way or the other.249 Nor did the panel regard it as
significant that Congress had occasionally conferred copyrights on authors in private acts, 250 or
that Congress had given some foreign authors the power to correct deficient formalities when the
ordinary deposit procedure was disrupted by the two world wars.251 Finding that plaintiffs’ rights
to engage in artistic expression encompassed “a First Amendment interest in using works in the
public domain,”252 an interest arguably impaired by the URAA and not adequately protected by
what the Supreme Court labeled the “built-in free speech safeguards” of copyright law,253 the
panel remanded the case to the district court to conduct a new First Amendment analysis under
proper standards.

Id. at 1187 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
243

244

Id. at 1189.

245

Id.

246

Id. at 1187.

247

See id. at 1189–90.

248

Id. at 1191.

Id. at 1190–91; see also id. at 1191 (“the answer to the question of whether Congress thought it was
removing works from the public domain [at the time of the 1790 Act] is probably not just unclear but also
unknowable.”).
249

Id. (“Far from providing evidence that copyrighting works in the public domain is within the traditional
contours of copyright protection, the fact that individuals were forced to resort to the uncommon tactic of petitioning
Congress demonstrates that this practice was outside the normal practice.”).
250

251

See id. at 1191–92.

252

Id. at 1193.

253

Id. at 1194 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (internal quotations omitted)).
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On remand, the district court struck down the statute.254 Because the parties agreed that
the URAA imposed a content-neutral restriction on speech, the district court asked whether the
statute “advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.”255 The
court accepted the government’s argument that the URAA was enacted to bring the United States
into compliance with the Berne Convention.256 Although the statute protected the plaintiffs’
interests in expressive reuse of foreign works insofar as it gave them the right to continue
exploiting such works during the one-year window following the filing of a restoration notice by
a foreign copyright holder, and to continued exploitation of a derivative work indefinitely upon
payment of a licensing fee,257 the district court believed that these protections still “le[ft]
unprotected a substantial amount of speech not tied to the Government’s interest.”258 The district
court then noted that the Berne Convention appeared to grant member nations great discretion in
determining how, and upon what conditions, to recognize copyrights in works of foreign authors
that were still copyrighted in those authors’ home countries.259 Rather than taking advantage of
that discretion to preserve the plaintiffs’ reliance interests in reusing public-domain works,
however, Congress legislated those interests out of existence. Because the URAA “suppresses
the right of reliance parties to use works they exploited while the works were in the public
254

Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009).

Id. at 1170 (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)) (internal quotations
omitted).
255

256

See id. at 1172; see also supra notes 223, 231 and accompanying text.

257

See Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1173; see also supra notes 237–238 and accompanying text.

258

Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256) (internal quotations omitted).

As already noted, Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention required member nations to extend copyright
protection “to all works which . . . have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the
expiry of the term of protection.” See supra note 223 and accompanying text. The Berne Convention further
provided, however, that in the absence of contrary agreements between member nations, “the respective countries
shall determine, each in so far as it is concerned, the conditions of application of this principle.” Berne Convention,
supra note 115, Art. 18(3). Before the URAA, the United States’ position was that this language essentially excused
it from complying with Article 18(1). See supra note 226 and accompanying text. Although the subsequent TRIPS
Agreement appeared to impose a stricter obligation on member nations (see supra note 231 and accompanying text),
the district court believed that considerable discretion remained:
259

I read Article 18, Section 3, as a grant of discretion to member nations to implement the
Berne Convention’s directive—that the copyrights of foreign authors be restored so long
as the term of copyright protection in the country of origin has not expired—in light of
each member nation’s established corpus of copyright law. Such discretion is not limited
by Article 18, Section 3, so long as the directive is applied within the bounds of existing
law. In the United States, for example, it is not disputed that the restored copyrights must
still be subject to the well-established First Amendment exceptions afforded by the fairuse doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy.
Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (citations omitted).
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domain,” it was “substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest” in
complying with the requirements of the Berne Convention.260 Finally, the district court rejected,
as unsubstantiated by the evidence, two further justifications the government articulated in
support of the statute—namely, that adherence to Article 18(1) was required in order to secure
similar protection for United States authors in the copyright laws of other nations, and that the
URAA served to correct historically inequitable treatment of foreign authors in the United
States.261
A different panel of the court of appeals reversed and upheld the statute.262 After
reviewing the history of the URAA and the course of the litigation to date, the panel turned to the
question whether the “restoration” of foreign copyrights under Section 514 violated the First
Amendment.263 As the district court had, the panel found that Section 514 imposed a contentneutral regulation of speech and that intermediate scrutiny was proper.264 The panel viewed the
governmental interests at stake in enacting the URAA quite differently from the district court,
however. The district court had determined that the only cognizable interest the government had
shown to underlie Section 514 was the interest in adhering to international treaty commitments,
while rejecting the government’s assertions that the statute also served to protect American
authors in other countries and to correct historical inequities.265 In contrast, the court of appeals
found the government’s interest in protecting the interests of American authors overseas to be
well established and essentially case-dispositive.266
The panel stumbled at first in suggesting that American authors actually have a
constitutional right to copyright protection;267 a proposition that, if read literally, would
undermine long-settled precedents establishing that federal copyright protection exists as a
matter of legislative grace.268 Even if the interests the statute sought to protect were not of
260

Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

See id. at 1175–77; cf. supra note 197 and accompanying text (noting history of disparate treatment of
domestic and foreign works under United States law).
261

Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010). Judge Briscoe was a member of the panel that had
remanded the case to the district court in 2007, and wrote the panel’s opinion when the case returned to the Tenth
Circuit in 2010.
262

263

See id. at 1080–82.

264

Id. at 1083; see also supra note 255 and accompanying text.

265

See supra notes 256, 261 and accompanying text.

See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1083 (“We hold that the government has demonstrated a substantial interest in
protecting American copyright holders’ interests abroad, and Section 514 is narrowly tailored to advance that
interest.”).
266

267

See id. at 1084 (“Although plaintiffs have First Amendment interests, so too do American authors.”).

See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932) (“the Congress did not sanction an existing right but created a new one”); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON,
268
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constitutional magnitude, however, the panel found persuasive evidence in the legislative record
that the national interest was impaired by the underprotection of American works in overseas
markets.269 Because foreign governments had insisted upon full compliance with the Berne
Convention by the United States as a condition of extending comparable copyright protections to
American authors, the panel continued, Congress reasonably could have concluded that enacting
Section 514 would lead to corresponding improvements in the protection of United States works
abroad.270
The panel next determined that the statute was not broader than necessary to achieve the
government’s purpose. As the panel saw it, the burdens Section 514 imposed upon American
users of foreign copyrighted works mirrored those Congress hoped foreign nations would impose
on users of United States works, and that the legislative purpose would therefore be frustrated if
those burdens were not imposed.271 The panel gave no weight to the plaintiffs’ contention, which
the district court had judged highly significant, that the Berne Convention permitted each
member nation to exercise a great deal of discretion in choosing how to implement its
obligations under Article 18. In the panel’s view, that contention presupposed that achieving
Berne compliance was the only goal of the URAA, whereas the panel saw the statute as aimed
more broadly at serving the interests of American authors in overseas markets.272 The fact that
other nations had achieved Berne compliance while protecting the interests of parties who had
relied on the public domain status of foreign works did not demonstrate that Section 514 was
insufficiently tailored because the intermediate scrutiny standard of review did not require the
government to use the least restrictive means available.273 Because the statute advanced a
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 198 (1968) (“The idea that pervades the statute [the Copyright Act of 1790]
is that copyright is a government grant, a statutory privilege—not a right.”); id. at 201–02 (noting that this
characterization has been carried forward into subsequent legislation); Gordon, supra note 125, at 1535 (“Judges
have failed to use the First Amendment to provide extensive protection for free expression in intellectual property
cases, in part because they mistakenly find a warrant for strong ‘authors’ rights’ in a philosophy of natural law.”);
Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of “Fair Use” in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 790,
791–92 (1975) (“A long and uninterrupted line of cases holds unequivocally that, apart from common law protection
for unpublished works, copyright protection is completely and solely a statutory matter and that copyright is . . .
simply a creature of statute, wholly a matter of congressional discretion to grant or to withhold”) (footnotes
omitted). But cf. John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
465 (2005) (arguing that emergence of fair use doctrine beginning in the mid-19th century began to reintroduce
considerations of natural rights into copyright despite earlier cases’ suggestions that the subject is wholly statutory).
269

See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1084–86.

270

Id. at 1086–90.

271

Id. at 1090–91.

272

Id. at 1091–92; cf. supra note 259 and accompanying text.

See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1092. The panel also disputed the premise of the challengers’ argument, finding that
even other nations’ protections for reliance parties were qualified and conditional and did not more expansively
protect speech than did the URAA. See id. at 1093.
273

http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/1

46

Armstrong: Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain

substantial governmental interest without burdening substantially more speech than necessary,
the panel concluded, the URAA survived First Amendment scrutiny.274
The Supreme Court affirmed by a 6–2 vote.275 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg
rejected constitutional challenges grounded both in the Progress Clause and the First
Amendment. As to the former, the majority in Golan offered essentially the same rhetorical
rebuff to the petitioners’ argument as the Court of Appeals had in Kahle: Justice Ginsburg
declared that the challenge to Congress’s power to remove copyrighted works from the public
domain was largely foreclosed by the Court’s conclusion in Eldred that Congress may lawfully
extend the duration of existing copyrights.276 The majority also relied on the Copyright Act of
1790 and several private bills to support its contention that “[h]istorical practice” validated
legislative removal of expressive works from the public domain.277 The majority also analogized
to a series of cases decided in the early to mid-19th century which had upheld the grant of patent
rights to inventions that had previously lost such protection, and rejected the suggestion that the
Court’s later assertion in Graham that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain” cast doubt on the
ongoing validity of those earlier precedents.278 Finally, the majority reiterated that the
constitutional directive that copyright legislation “promote Progress” did not require that all
copyright statutes must lead to the creation of new expressive works; rather, Congress could
choose instead to “promote Progress” by rewarding publishers of past works.279
The majority turned next to the First Amendment issue. Unlike both lower courts, the
Supreme Court devoted no attention to the question of which First Amendment standard of
review applied.280 Instead, the Golan majority found in Eldred a broad level of tolerance for

274

Id. at 1094.

275

Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). Justice Kagan recused herself. See id.

See id. at 884 (“Our decision in Eldred is largely dispositive of petitioners’ limited-time argument.”); cf.
supra notes 211–218 and accompanying text.
276

277

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 885–86; cf. supra notes 249–250 and accompanying text.

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 886–87 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). Cf. supra notes
162, 239 and accompanying text. The majority’s treatment of Graham is particularly unsatisfying insofar as the
majority recast language that by its express terms at least purported to describe the outermost reach of legislative
power under the Progress Clause and instead declared that it “did not speak to the constitutional limits on Congress’
copyright and patent authority.” Compare Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 202 n.7
(2003)), with supra note 239 and accompanying text; see also Robert F. Kappers, Note, Is What You Give, Really
What You Get? The Effect of Golan v. Holder on the Deterioration of the Public Domain, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1053,
1073 (2013).
278

279

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887–89; see also supra note 154 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 255, 264 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Margot Kaminski, Copyright Crime and
Punishment: The First Amendment’s Proportionality Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. 587, 600 (2013) (“Functionally,
280
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legislation that burdens the reuse of copyrighted works, because such burdens increase the
incentives for such works to be created and distributed in the first place.281 And while the Court
in Eldred had seemingly identified the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine
merely as illustrative examples of copyright law’s “built-in First Amendment
accommodations,”282 in Golan, those two doctrines crystallized into the only exceptions to
copyright protection that the First Amendment required Congress to honor.283
The majority next considered whether the petitioners’ own long-term use of formerly
public-domain works carried any constitutional weight. The Court’s answer to that question was
to declare that no one has any property right in a work in the public domain,284 and therefore, no
one suffers a deprivation of a right when formerly public domain works are converted into
private property. In the majority’s words: “[a]nyone has free access to the public domain, but no
one, after the copyright term has expired, acquires ownership rights in the once-protected
works.”285 Moreover, the majority insisted, access to the restored works upon payment of a
license fee to the new proprietor was a constitutionally adequate replacement for the free access
that the petitioners had enjoyed before the enactment of the URAA.286 The inability to locate the

Eldred and Golan put most copyright regulations outside of First Amendment protection, as though copyright
questions were an unprotected category of speech.”) (footnote omitted).
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–90. As already noted, the Court has been somewhat inconsistent in its
statements as to whether copyright protection itself, or exceptions and limitations upon copyright holders’ exclusive
rights, better serve the goals of promoting free expression. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. Golan
offers little clarity on this point except to repeat that the Framers “saw copyright as an ‘engine of free expression[.]’”
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
281

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20; see also supra notes 157–158 and accompanying text; Birnhack, supra note
144, at 279–82 (recognizing these doctrines as necessary, but not sufficient, protections for expressive interests).
282

See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91 (“Section 514 leaves undisturbed the ‘idea/expression’ distinction and the
‘fair use’ defense.”).
283

Cf., e.g., John J. Sierotnik, Note, Golan v. Holder, the Copyright Clause, and the Changing Public Policy
Underlying Copyright Law in the United States, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 411, 427–28 (2014)
(noting debate before the URAA over whether the “public domain” might be characterized as property jointly owned
by everyone).
284

Id. at 892. The majority’s choice of language is puzzling; after all, enabling foreign authors to “acquire
ownership rights” over formerly public-domain works was the avowed purpose and effect of the URAA, and the
Golan petitioners’ complaint was that, after the statute, they no longer enjoyed the “free access to the public
domain” as it existed before the enactment of Section 514. The essence of the challenge raised in Golan was that the
URAA upended the very system the majority described for all foreign works that had entered the public domain in
the United States for any reason other than through the expiration of the statutory term of protection.
285

See id. at 893 (noting that even after the passage of the URAA, formerly public-domain works may
continue to be used so long as “the right to [do so is] obtained in the marketplace”).
286
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authors of some works in order to conclude a license would be unfortunate, in the majority’s
view, but problems of that type were for Congress, not the Court, to remedy.287
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, dissented. Whereas Justice Breyer’s dissent in
Eldred had rested predominantly on First Amendment concerns,288 in Golan his arguments were
grounded almost exclusively on the Progress Clause.289 In Justice Breyer’s view, the pertinent
standard by which to ascertain whether copyright legislation “promote[d] the progress of
science”290 lay in determining whether it encouraged the production of new expressive works.291
The works to which the URAA applied, however, consisted almost entirely of works whose
publication preceded the statute’s enactment, making it virtually impossible for the URAA to
spur new creative production.292 Although the statute could do nothing to stimulate new
expression, its effects on the “millions” of past works to which it applied293 were pernicious: the
statute would remove such works from the public domain and require would-be users of the
works to locate and identify the foreign copyright holder (a potentially costly undertaking,
especially for older works) and to negotiate individually for a license.294 The administrative costs
alone of complying with the statute, in Justice Breyer’s view, would deter many uses of the
works to which the statute applied, including uses for socially beneficial purposes such as
archiving and education.295 Still more serious was the statute’s upsetting of the settled
287

See id. at 893–94.

288

See supra notes 167–177 and accompanying text.

While noting the existence of expressive harms caused by the statute, Justice Breyer gave them little
independent weight. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 907–08 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“For present purposes, I need not
decide whether the harms to [speech-related] interest[s] show a violation of the First Amendment. I need only point
to the importance of interpreting the Constitution as a single document—a document that we should not read as
setting the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment at cross-purposes.”).
289

290

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 899 (“In this sense, a copyright is, in Macaulay’s words, a ‘tax on readers for the
purpose of giving a bounty to writers’—a bounty designed to encourage new production”) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
id. at 903 (“text, history, and precedent demonstrate that the Copyright Clause places great value on the power of
copyright to elicit new production”) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
291

292

See id. at 903–04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See id. at 904 (noting estimates of number of foreign works whose copyrights would come into force in the
United States under Section 514).
293

294

See id. at 904–06 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Of course, at least some of the socially beneficial uses that Justice Breyer
feared would be curtailed under the statute might nevertheless be excused under the fair use doctrine. See, e.g.,
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d
282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Nevertheless, the unpredictability of fair use in practice may deter some lawful uses. See
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565
n.66 (2008) (“Indeed, the very unpredictability of fair use outcomes may lead defendants to settle”); William W.
Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1693–95 (1988).
295
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expectations of users who had relied on the public-domain status of the restored works but would
now be compelled to pay for the privilege of continuing to use such works.296
The dissent also read the historical record quite differently from the majority. Unlike the
CTEA (which was at issue in Eldred) and the other statutes on which the majority relied, the
URAA contained no provisions of general applicability to future works.297 Although Eldred
stood for the proposition that Congress lawfully may maintain parity by applying the same 20year term extension to both past and future copyrights alike, Justice Breyer saw nothing therein
that supported singling out past works for uniquely advantageous treatment. He labeled
“somewhat farfetched” the majority’s analogy to “private bills, statutes retroactively granting
protection in wartime, or the like.”298 Rather, on Justice Breyer’s reading of the record, prior to
the URAA, Congress had enacted “a virtually unbroken string of legislation preventing the
withdrawal of works from the public domain.”299 And although the majority had suggested that
Congress could reasonably conclude that providing new incentives for the dissemination of past
works would ultimately serve the constitutional objective,300 Justice Breyer rejoined that
extending copyright protection to a formerly public-domain work was more likely to limit than to
enhance the availability of that work to the public.301 Finally, echoing some of the criticisms
articulated in the district court’s opinion on remand, Justice Breyer found that the putative
conflict between the URAA and the requirements of the Constitution was essentially a problem
the Government had brought upon itself by failing to exercise the Berne Convention’s provided
flexibilities to protect the reliance interests of users of public-domain works.302
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (complaining that the URAA “reverses the payment
expectations of those who used, or intended to use, works that they thought belonged to them”). Justice Breyer
believed that this problem was simply not considered by Congress at the time it enacted the URAA. See id. at 907
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that “Congress, with one minor exception, heard testimony only from the
representatives of existing copyright holders, who hoped that passage of the statute would enable them to benefit
from reciprocal treatment of American authors abroad”).
296

See id. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The [URAA] grants its ‘restored copyright[s]’ only to works already
produced. It provides no monetary incentive to produce anything new.”).
297

298

Id. at 909 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

299

Id. (citations omitted).

300

See supra note 279 and accompanying text.

See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 909–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 910 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This
argument, whatever its intrinsic merits, is an argument that directly concerns a private benefit: how to obtain more
money from the sales of existing products. It is not an argument about a public benefit, such as how to promote or to
protect the creative process.”). Some research has offered support for Justice Breyer’s view that public domain
works are more widely available for public use. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things
Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1, 22–23 (2013); Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared (Illinois Public Law Research Paper
No. 13-54, July 5, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290181.
301

302

See id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. supra notes 259–260 and accompanying text.
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Golan is a remarkable decision for many reasons. Considered together with Eldred and
Kahle, it marks the third consecutive (and potentially most consequential) defeat for parties
seeking to preserve the public domain against encroachment by proprietary claims. The fact that
the decision upheld a statute that effectively took property that was already freely available for
public use and instead converted that same property for private financial benefit led Duke Law
School’s Center for the Study of the Public Domain to sound this note of alarm:
What are the limits on this decision? Could Congress recall the works of
Shakespeare, Plato, Mozart and Melville from the public domain, and
create new legalized monopolies over them? It is hard to imagine anything
more contrary to the First Amendment—would privatizing Shakespeare by
government decree abridge freedom of speech?—or to the attitudes of
those who penned the Copyright Clause that limits Congress’s power to
create new exclusive rights. Yet if one reads Golan, one searches in vain
for any limiting principle on Congress’s actions. In this decision, Justice
Ginsburg’s majority opinion effectively denies the public domain any
meaningful Constitutional protection. Under the U.S. Constitution, says
this case, the public domain is “public” only by sufferance. It may be
privatized at any moment, at the whim of the Congress and without
violating the Bill of Rights.303
Moreover, in both Golan and Eldred, the Court rebuffed First Amendment challenges to
copyright legislation without even specifying the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny,
effectively carving out a special exemption from ordinary First Amendment analysis that
seemingly applies only in copyright cases.304
Most fundamentally, Golan rests upon a crabbed and outdated understanding of the
public domain. Of the four interests served by a robust public domain that were sketched out
above,305 only the third—emphasizing the public domain’s function as a repository of scientific
truth and factual matter—receives even glancing recognition in Golan, through the majority’s
Center for the Study of the Public Domain, Duke Law School, The Incredible Shrinking Public Domain, at
https://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/publicdomainday/2013/shrinking (last visited July 14, 2014); see also ROBERT SPOO,
WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING, AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 266–68 (2013) (discussing “startling”
implications of Golan majority’s rhetoric, which makes it “hard to imagine any limit to what Congress might choose
to withdraw from the endangered commons”).
303

See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1115–27
(2010) (criticizing Court’s “copyright exceptionalism”); see also supra note 125 and accompanying text. Of course,
validly enacted federal legislation, including the CTEA and URAA, enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. See,
e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). Both Eldred and Golan go quite a bit further, however, in
presuming that speech-regulating legislation need not be subjected to First Amendment analysis at all if enacted in
the exercise of Congress’s copyright power.
304

305

See supra notes 75–106 and accompanying text.
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insistence that Congress preserve the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use rule.306 One
searches the Golan majority’s opinion in vain for any glimmer of Judge Kozinski’s recognition
that restricting the public domain threatens creativity, or Judge Posner’s concern that allowing
the heirs of long-dead authors to extract excessive tolls from tomorrow’s creators impoverishes
us all.307 Would-be reusers of public domain material appear to the Golan majority as ungrateful
freeloaders who believe that the Constitution entitles them to something for nothing. This is a
vision unmoored from over two decades’ worth of consistent, high-quality scholarship on the
actual value of the public domain.
And so, in a nutshell, stands the fundamental issue dividing contemporary copyright law
from the broadest strands in the consensus of expert opinion. Although most serious copyright
scholarship engages, because it must, with the actual collection of treaties, statutes, and court
decisions that govern the subject, the evidence and arguments that have apparently moved
Congress and the courts to act strike most scholars as unpersuasive. For their part, Congress and
the courts have seemed to be ignorant of, or even hostile to, the careful and thorough legal
literature on the public domain that has blossomed in recent decades. Copyright law and
copyright scholarship are conducting dueling monologues, not a dialogue, on the public domain.
B. Preserving the Public Domain
Examples of courts and policy-makers acknowledging the value and importance of the
public domain, and the risks of construing copyright law in a fashion that cedes too much control
over the developing information ecosystem to past publishers of expressive works, are more
difficult to locate. When courts speak of the public domain in copyright cases, they typically do
so only by way of fixing the outer boundary of the copyright holder’s proprietary claims, rather
than as an independent corpus of creative material that deserves support and protection.308
Nevertheless, although the overall trend remains strongly in the direction of greater proprietary
control, other strands of argument do appear from time to time. The examples of Judges Kozinski
and Posner emphasizing the importance of preserving the public domain against excessive
proprietary incursion have already been mentioned,309 as has Justice Brandeis’s admonition that

See supra note 283 and accompanying text. Although the Court’s reference to the fair use doctrine might be
taken as an effort to accommodate interests beyond mere reuse of factual matter, the fair use doctrine offers less than
meets the eye here. The possibility that an accused infringer may ultimately prevail on a fair use defense (after being
put to the burden of litigating the issue in circumstances where the outcome may not reliably be predicted, see supra
note 295) entails materially greater risk to the would-be fair user than does the use of public domain materials as to
which no infringement claim may be brought at all.
306

307

See supra notes 86, 87 and accompanying text.

308

See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.

See supra note 307 and accompanying text. Of course, in the cases cited, only Judge Posner’s opinion
commanded a majority; Judge Kozinski was dissenting from a decision which found that an electronics
manufacturer’s print advertisement potentially violated California’s right of publicity law even though the claim was
309
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“the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—
become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”310
The copyright debate briefly spilled over into the realm of American partisan politics
recently, doubtlessly exposing at least some observers to the competing arguments for the first
time. In late 2012, the House Republican Study Committee issued a report entitled “Three Myths
About Copyright Law and Where to Start to Fix It.”311 Consistent with the partisan orientation of
the organization that issued the report, the author attacked what he characterized as “three
myths” that had produced copyright rules at variance with American conservative political
principles. The substance of the report’s critique, however, would be familiar to scholars across
the political spectrum. The report argued that (1) copyright law had become inordinately focused
upon providing financial returns to content producers rather than upon maximizing creativity and
innovation; (2) the law contravened free-market principles by establishing a heavily regulated,
government-provided monopoly; and (3) copyright law in practice slowed, rather than
accelerated, creative output, scientific inquiry, digital preservation, added-value industries, and
legitimate journalism and oversight.312 The report argued that the ever-lengthening terms of
copyright (of the type the Supreme Court had upheld in Eldred) harmed knowledge and learning
by barring free reuse of most works published during the last ninety years.313 Keeping all such
works out of the public domain, the report argued, also discouraged the development of new
industries and technologies to access, annotate, and share such works.314
Although commentators across the political spectrum praised the report,315 it was
withdrawn only one day later due to pressure from the content industries, and its author lost his
job.316 Again, the report reflected only the views of an individual House staffer and its
recommendations have not formed the basis for any legislative proposals. But the nowwithdrawn report nevertheless illustrates how the past generation of scholarship on the necessity
of protecting the public domain may exert at least some influence among policy makers.
filed by an actor who did not actually appear in the advertisement. See White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971
F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoted
supra note 63 and accompanying text).
310

Although the report was swiftly withdrawn by the Republican Study Committee, it was later published by
the House staffer who wrote it. See Derek Khanna, Republican Study Committee Policy Brief: Three Myths About
Copyright Law and Where to Start to Fix It, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2013).
311

312

See id. at 3–7.

313

Id. at 6.

314

Id. at 7.

See Derek Khanna, Reflection on the House Republican Study Committee Copyright Report, 32 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 12–14 (2013).
315

316

See id. at 14–15.
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V.

Can Copyright Reform Succeed?

In antitrust law, criticism of what scholars perceived to be consumer-unfriendly liability
rules led to a wholesale transformation of legal doctrine along the lines that the critics preferred.
In copyright, critiques of how existing legal rules harm the public, although forcefully
articulated, have produced no comparable impact on policy. The question is, why not?
Comparing the attributes of the two movements may suggest fruitful directions for further
advocacy. This section will sketch out four families of possible explanations, one focused on the
nature of the scholarly critique of copyright law and the others focused, in turn, on the branches
of the federal government, each of which occupies a different role in the formulation of
copyright policy. Within each family, one may identify points of both commonality and contrast
with the revolution in antitrust law that bear closer examination.317
A. Explanations Focusing on the Nature of Copyright Scholarship
The critical body of antitrust scholarship that emerged in the 1960s began almost
immediately to influence the decisions of the courts in ways that continued to develop for several
decades.318 Perhaps the reason why the body of critical contemporary copyright scholarship has
so far yielded no comparable results has to do with differing characteristics of the latter body of
literature. That is, perhaps copyright scholarship differs from antitrust scholarship in ways that
tend to diminish its relative impact on policy.
1. Locating the Consensus of Scholarly Opinion
One possibility that should be confronted, in the interest of intellectual honesty, is that my
own perception of a critical consensus of disinterested expert opinion is actually in error. My
own review of the scholarship on copyright law leads me to the conclusion that a rough but
substantial consensus has formed around the desirability of protecting and expanding the public
domain, a policy prescription that stands sharply at variance from the recent restrictive trend of
copyright legislation and court decisions.319 If the center of gravity in copyright discourse
My position as a legal scholar rather than a political scientist or public policy researcher leads me to ground
the inquiry that follows predominantly in legal terms, rather than primarily in terms of institutional prerogatives or
interest-group dynamics. Where the topic under scrutiny concerns the formulation and implementation of policy in
the real world, however, it may be impossible as a practical matter to avoid brushing up against domains that may be
more developed outside legal discourse than within it. It is highly likely that the development of more robust
answers to the questions raised in this section of the essay will depend critically upon the use of insights from
academic domains different from my own.
317

For an example of recent work attempting to apply methodologies from other domains to the analysis of legal
questions, see Daniel Martin Katz, Michael James Bommarito II, & Josh Blackman, Predicting the Behavior of the
Supreme Court of the United States: A General Approach, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463244 (July 21,
2014).
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See generally supra notes 16–60 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 75–106 and accompanying text.
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actually rests elsewhere, in a position more hospitable to the ever-greater restrictions on the
public domain that have been a hallmark of United States policy for decades, then it would be
quite unsurprising for Congress and the courts to proceed as they in fact have. Although I have
sought to avoid doing so, perhaps I have self-selected a subset of the extant copyright scholarship
that happens to appeal to me and misidentified where the scholarly consensus actually rests.320
To the argument that my misapprehension of the location of the scholarly consensus
explains the perceived resistance of Congress and the courts to that consensus, two responses
might be made, neither of which requires acceptance of my perception of a disinterested expert
consensus.321
First, the example of the Chicago School’s influence on antitrust law counters any notion
that critical ideas must become part of the conventional wisdom before they exert influence on
policy. Law-and-economics scholarship began to influence the courts in antitrust cases almost
immediately, even if its full impact was not felt until some decades had elapsed.322 Even as the
law-and-economics movement was transforming antitrust law, however, its own core premises
were the subject of vigorous and ongoing debate.323 Competing strands of scholarly opinion in
antitrust continued waging rear-guard actions long after the Chicago School methodology had
taken root in the case law.324 The point, again, is not to argue over whether the courts should
have reoriented antitrust doctrine along the lines suggested by Chicago School economic theory
Cf. Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 317–20
(2009) (cautioning scholars on both sides of the intellectual property debate to avoid dividing themselves into
insular and competing camps).
320

Of course, I don’t believe I am incorrect in perceiving a broadly shared scholarly consensus that that
copyright law as presently constituted systematically undervalues the public domain and thereby disserves the public
interest. If I am truly wrong about what most scholars believe, I can say only that many others suffer from the same
confusion. See, e.g., supra note 120 and accompanying text.
321

322

See supra notes 16–60 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1987)
(summarizing and rebutting several challenges to the movement both inside and outside the legal academy in the
1970s); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. Rev. 1, 2–8 (1986) (identifying limits on value of
economic analysis in addressing complex social problems); Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem
of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929 (suggesting that novelty of applying economic jargon in legal analysis
challenged the ability of lawyers and judges to understand and articulate the law); cf. Richard A. Posner, The
Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 767–69 (1987) (arguing that
insights from economics, philosophy, political science and other domains ultimately strengthen legal discourse).
323

See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 219 (1995); Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1805, 1830–34 (1990) (criticizing executive enforcement actions and court decisions predicated upon Chicago
School economic analysis); Robert H. Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency)
Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631 (1989); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—
Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 NYU L. REV. 936, 956–60
(1987).
324
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as they in fact did. The point, rather, is simply to point out that that reorientation happened
before, not after, Chicago-style law-and-economic analysis attained anything approaching the
breadth of expert consensus that now prevails among copyright scholars on the law’s
underprotection of the public domain. Thus, even if I have incorrectly characterized the actual
consensus of disinterested expert opinion in copyright law, the transformation of antitrust law
based upon research that was not yet the subject of a similar consensus suggests that the
existence of consensus is not dispositive.
Second, regardless of whether reform-oriented copyright scholars actually represent a
numerical majority of disinterested experts, as I believe, those scholars’ arguments have been
painstakingly explained and developed in a voluminous and still-expanding body of professional
literature and deserve a fair hearing in any forum that aspires to intellectual rigor. The quality of
the arguments for protecting the public domain matters even more than their quantity. If the
scholars whose views were briefly surveyed above are correct, then existing copyright law
systematically under-protects the public domain, thereby both harming consumers and
dampening technological innovation. The ideal of reasoned deliberation demands that an honest
decision-maker explain why those scholars are actually incorrect before enacting or upholding
further restrictions on the public domain. Intelligent rejoinders to the voluminous body of
contrary scholarship, however, are precisely what is missing from court decisions such as Eldred,
Kahle, and Golan. The cases’ failure even to recognize, much less to rebut, the insights
developed in the modern corpus of copyright scholarship on the public domain is itself a
problem, irrespective of whether that corpus actually reflects (as I believe it does) the consensus
of disinterested expert opinion.
2. Scholarship and Decision-making
A second response might explain the apparent lack of influence exerted by critical
copyright scholarship by asking whether scholars’ views actually matter to real-world decisionmakers such as legislative bodies and courts. Chicago-School antitrust reformers of the 1960s
and 1970s, the argument might run, wrote articles intended to be immediately useful to
enforcement agencies and courts. Since that time, critics might continue, legal scholarship has
become pedantic and abstruse, concerned less with practical application than with debating how
many angels may dance on the head of a pin. This change in the nature of legal scholarship, a
skeptical advocate might conclude, explains why antitrust scholarship succeeded in moving the
courts where copyright scholarship has not.
Some judges, to be sure, have questioned the practical relevance of legal scholarship to
real-world disputes. More than two decades have passed since Judge Harry Edwards said that
courts had little use for the work of legal scholars,325 and others have taken up the refrain since

See Edwards, supra note 4. The intervening years have not softened Judge Edwards’ views. See Harry T.
Edwards, Another Look at Professor Rodell’s Goodbye to Law Reviews, 100 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2014).
325
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that time.326 By this point, perhaps the complaint that legal scholarship is irrelevant to legal
practice has been repeated often enough to become a self-fulfilling prophecy: courts have been
told so often that legal scholarship is whimsical, absurd, and divorced from reality that they may
no longer even bother to investigate whether anything in the scholarly literature may be of
assistance in deciding a pending case. On the other hand, some measures suggest that judicial
citations to legal scholarship are increasing, or at least not declining, inviting the inference that
To take a widely reported example, Chief Justice John Roberts responded to a question about the
disconnect between the legal academy and the judiciary by criticizing legal scholarship (while simultaneously
admitting that he does not actually read it):
326

Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, you
know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in eighteenth-century
Bulgaria, or something, which I am sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote
it, but isn’t of much help to the bar . . . . [I]f the academy is interested in having an
influence on the practice of law and the development of law, that they would be wise to
sort of stop and think, is this area of research going to be of help to anyone other than
other academics. You know, it’s their business, but people ask me, what the last law
review article I read was, and I have to think very hard before I come up with one.
Annual Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Conference, C-SPAN, at http://www.c-span.org/Events/AnnualFourthCircuit-Court-of-Appeals-Conference/10737422476-1/, at 28:50 (June 25, 2011). Some scholars disputed the
characterization. See, e.g., Danielle Citron, Sherrilyn Ifill on What the Chief Justice Should Read on Summer
Vacation, CONCURRING OPINIONS, at http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/07/sherrilyn-ifill-on-what-thechief-justice-should-read-on-summer-vacation.html (July 1, 2011). Others have acknowledged at least some of the
force of the criticism and offered proposals aimed at rectifying the perceived disconnect between the bench and the
academy. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Keith Hirokawa, & Sean Nolon, Towards Engaged Scholarship, 33 PACE L. REV.
821 (2013); Ross E. Davies, In Search of Helpful Legal Scholarship, Part 2: Shall We Dance, 2 J.L. 255 (2012). A
puckish rejoinder to the Chief Justice is available in Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary
Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2015).
The Final Report of the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, issued in January
2014 but not yet adopted by the full ABA as of the date of this writing, also called for at least some law schools to
deemphasize the production of scholarship, citing the benefits of greater heterogeneity among institutions and the
need for greater cost-benefit scrutiny of faculty scholarly activity. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION 34 (Jan. 2014), at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_recommendatio
ns_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf. Others, however, have challenged the notion that a de-emphasis on faculty
scholarship will improve either educational outcomes or our system of justice:
We all are bombarded with data; consumed with information; and too often lack the time
needed for reflection; the time needed to cultivate wisdom. The vision of a scholar in her
garret has not lost its appeal. Nor has it lost its value. It is that scholar who has the time
and freedom to reflect deeply on the law and wonder about the connection or connections
between law and justice or about the nature and elements of a good society. In a word, we
can call these reflections scholarship and they are the essential elements of a sound
structure of legal education as distinct from legal training.
Joseph P. Tomain, ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, Working Paper (August 1, 2013), available at
http://perma.cc/J6J5-YU3U.
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some judges find this scholarship useful.327 Nevertheless, perhaps legal scholarship in general
(and copyright scholarship in particular) simply holds less value today to decision-makers
attempting to resolve real-world disputes.
This explanation, too, has some problems. If Judge Edwards’s critique was ever valid as a
general matter, it is certainly impossible to sustain as a description of contemporary copyright
scholarship. Only someone ignorant of the current copyright literature could believe it to be a
domain of airy, highfalutin theorizing. To the contrary, as Professor Ann Bartow has written:
The problem is not a lack of useful academic writings on the subjects
within the purview of the Copyright Act. There are many brilliant law
review articles that make a host of sensible normative recommendations,
and many legal scholars have written trenchant critiques describing
misinterpretations or misapplications of copyright law. But the practical
effect of most of this work has generally been quite modest.328
The academic critique of how the courts and Congress have jointly restricted the public domain
demonstrates that existing doctrine does real harm to real persons. Current law reduces the
overall level of creative and innovative activity and impedes the dissemination of knowledge.
This is what is actually happening in the world right now, today; and it will keep happening until
the law improves. Scholars’ concerns are far from unduly abstract or theoretical; to the contrary,
they lie at the core of copyright law’s constitutional purpose.
Moreover, even if a general belief in the irrelevance of legal scholarship leads courts not
to seek out pertinent sources in a particular case, competent attorneys have every incentive to
Professors Lee Petherbridge and David Schwartz have explored this question from a variety of angles. See
Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship,
106 NW. U.L. REV. 995, 1007–09 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by
the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1359–64 (2011). See also Wisdom,
supra note 4.
327

Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L.
REV. 457, 464 (2014); see also id. at 464–66 (responding to Chief Justice Roberts’ criticism of legal scholarship and
concluding that it “is especially true with copyright law” that “really good law review articles on important topics
can be completely overlooked”).
328

Professors Petherbridge and Schwartz recently found that during the last half century, the Supreme Court actually
cited legal scholarship more frequently in copyright cases than in most other types of cases; a fact that is not easily
squared with the contention that copyright scholarship has no value to courts. See Lee Petherbridge & David L.
Schwartz, The End of an Epithet? An Exploration of the Use of Legal Scholarship in Intellectual Property Decisions,
50 HOUS. L. REV. 523, 540, 542 (2012); see also id. at 556–57 (hypothesizing possible explanations for the
imbalance in the Court’s citation patterns of copyright and trademark law scholarship). Although Professor Bartow’s
work, quoted above, again identifies the courts’ overreliance on the Nimmer on Copyright treatise as an area of
particular concern, this factor cannot explain the imbalance found in Professors Petherbridge and Schwartz’s study,
because their data set excluded citations to legal treatises. See id. at 539; see also Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the
Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581 (2004).
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incorporate the insights from scholarship into their own arguments to the court, making it
unlikely that those sources will remain forever unknown to the courts.329 The argument that
scholarship has little worth and will be ignored by decision-makers, accordingly, seems to me to
miss the mark in the copyright context.
3. Measuring the Impact of Copyright Law
A third possibility might be that the available academic copyright literature is
insufficiently robust to serve as a reliable basis to guide or alter policy-making. Economics (and
also “law-and-economics”) scholarship, such as the scholarship that guided the courts’
transformation of antitrust law, is filled with formulas and graphs that convey the appearance
(and perhaps the reality) of analytical rigor. Economic scholarship served to quantify the tradeoffs involved in competing legal regimes: tighter environmental laws, for instance, may confer
social benefits by reducing exposure to toxins, but simultaneously exact social costs in the form
of higher prices for the goods polluters produce. Developing the “optimal” environmental
regime, economic analysis posits, entails quantifying and weighing the benefits versus the
associated costs to determine which approach yields the greatest aggregate social utility. 330
Perhaps the problem is that the extant copyright reform scholarship has not, as yet, reached the
same level of analytical strength as the scholarship upon which the courts based their
transformation of antitrust law. This possibility, to my mind at least, carries a little more force
than the previous two; although it surely is not the whole story.
Copyright law is often said to rest upon a sort of psychological inference about what
motivates creators to create: Authors whose works are unprotected against copying by others
may decline to create those works in the first place, depriving society of the benefit of their
creations. Conferring such protection via copyright, in contrast, provides an incentive that may
motivate the creation of at least some expressive works that would otherwise never have been
produced.331 Because providing such incentives will yield collective benefits by increasing the

329

See, e.g., Jared Klaus, Law Reviews: An Undervalued Resource, OHIO LAW., May/June 2012, at 28.

A classic version of this analysis is available in WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR
OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974).
330

See, e.g., Richard Watt, The Basic Economic Theory of Copyright, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 9, 13 (Richard Watt, ed., 2014). My summary is not intended
as an endorsement of the incentives rationale, which (as discussed below) has been questioned by more recent
scholarship. Further complicating matters, the incentives rationale has frequently been joined in U.S. history with a
second argument that characterizes creation as a morally praiseworthy activity deserving of reward for that reason
alone. See, e.g., Stewart E. Stark, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996). This
second argument is not easily squared with the Supreme Court’s clear disapproval of the so-called “sweat of the
brow” doctrine in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–54 (1996) (declaring
the investment of labor involved in the creation of a work to be irrelevant to the quantum of copyright protection
that work receives). See also Stark, supra, at 1220–22 (arguing that Feist calls even the “incentives” theory of
copyright into doubt).
331
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production of expressive works, the argument runs, providing such incentives makes sense in the
aggregate even if copyright protection increases the cost to a consumer of obtaining a work.
As a basis for a far-reaching legal regime with global effects on trade and cultural
development, this basic syllogism—if copyright, then more expressive works—fairly cries out for
supporting empirical detail.332 Which creators must receive incentives in order to induce them to
create?333 Which types of works will actually be under-produced if no incentives are supplied?334
Should we withhold incentives from works that we conclude would still be produced without
them?335 If incentives are necessary, should they take the form of a statutory monopoly as
copyright does, or are there less costly ways to stimulate the same level of creative output?336
How long must the incentives endure to secure the intended benefit?337 Do the strength and
duration of necessary incentives vary among different types of expressive works?338 And finally,
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, ©OPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ERA:
BUILDING EVIDENCE FOR POLICY 1 (2013) (noting that the “strident debate over copyright’s proper scope and terms
and means of its enforcement” “is poorly informed by independent empirical research”), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/14686/copyright-in-the-digital-era-building-evidence-for-policy.
332

Motion pictures, to take only one obvious example, result from the coordinated endeavors of the dozens or
even hundreds of creators whose names appear in the credits. Yet films have only a single “author”; all the other
contributors listed in the credits are legal strangers to the copyright. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227,
1232–36 (9th Cir. 2000); Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1612–14
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
333

334

See, e.g., Stark, supra note 331, at 1213–15.

See, e.g., Matthew P. Larvick, Questioning the Necessity of Copyright Protection for Software Interfaces,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 187; Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 344 (1970) (noting apparent irrelevance of copyright
protection to producers of early generations of computer software).
335

See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT ch. 6 (2004) (outlining alternative system to compensate producers of recorded entertainment,
modeled on the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, whereby funds collected from a levy on the sale of copying
tools and blank media would be distributed to creators of recorded entertainment proportionate to the measured
popularity of their works online); Breyer, supra note 335, at 305–08 (using purchasers’ cooperatives and government
subsidies to illustrate alternative financing systems for the production of some presently copyrighted works).
336

The principle that the public interest demands strict boundaries on the duration of copyright, although
ignored by the Congress that enacted the CTEA, is deeply rooted. This passage from Baron Macaulay’s speech in
the House of Commons on February 5, 1841 states the issue forthrightly:
337

It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of
remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good
we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary
for the purpose of securing the good.
The speech is reprinted in 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1476 (1994) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative
Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Michael J. Madison, Comment: Where Does
338
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given that every unit of social resources allocated to provide incentives to creators leaves one
less unit available to pursue other goals,339 and that providing incentives may have both positive
and negative effects on expressive output,340 what is the optimal level of creative production that
the law should aim to achieve?341 None of these questions is purely quantitative; each is tightly
interwoven with difficult issues of individual preference and social values.342 Yet each question
might be illuminated, at least partially, by types of data that remain largely unavailable to
contemporary decision-makers.343
The principle that copyright rules should be based upon facts and evidence about the realworld effects of competing policy choices, rather than psychological suppositions and romantic

Creativity Come From? and Other Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 761 (2003) (“Different types
or classes of authors may work in systematically different ways, suggesting that copyright’s contours should vary,
rather than remaining uniform across time and across all works.”).
See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV.
483, 655 (1996) (“justifying copyright requires some determination that society will benefit more from devoting
additional resources to creating works of authorship than from the alternative investments to which the resources
would otherwise have been devoted”).
339

340

See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and ‘Market Power’ in the Marketplace of Ideas, in
ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 149, 167–68 (Howard Shelanski & François
Lévêque, eds., 2005).
341

Professor Netanel, for example, has described the consequences of copyright restrictions for democratic civil
society and articulated an alternative vision that takes seriously the Supreme Court’s description of copyright as the
“engine of free expression.” See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 347–64 (1996); see also Netanel, supra note 341, at 169–71; supra note 92 and accompanying text. Professor
Netanel’s is a far more attractive vision, it seems to me, than the Supreme Court’s stated view that the public’s
interest lies solely in preserving the ability to purchase expressive works in the market. See supra note 286 and
accompanying text.
342

343

As Professor Madison put it:
We need research and analysis that explores not only, “Do we need the incentive of
intellectual property law or of copyright in particular?,” but in what ways and by what
methods do creators (individuals, firms, other institutions) draw on different resources in
the creative process, and what does that tell us about how the relevant legal regime
should be structured? We have workable supply-side models of law and creativity. The
law declares that it provides incentives of different sorts to create. We need demand-side
models, and empirical investigation of their robustness. What kinds of inputs do different
kinds of creators need or use? How are works created?

Madison, supra note 338, at 762 (footnotes omitted).
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moralizing about authorship, arose relatively recently344 and remains controversial.345
Nevertheless, new strands of evidence-based research have begun to appear in the copyright
literature.346
For the moment, however, academic research seeking to quantify the likely costs and
benefits of policy change in the copyright arena must subsist with a relative paucity of reliable
economic data. The development of reliable and impartial information to guide policy going
forward is itself apt to prove controversial. Existing copyright law supports highly concentrated,
profitable, and politically influential industries347 who derive direct economic benefits from
tightening intellectual property protections. Those industries’ propensity to over-hype perceived
competitive threats has been recognized elsewhere.348 Due to the possibility of bias stemming
from institutional self-interest, it is only appropriate to treat industry predictions about the value
of the creative industries to the global economy or alleged losses from copyright infringement
with some skepticism.349 Lacking unbiased alternative sources of data, however, scholars may
have little choice but to rely, at least in part, on self-reported industry statistics.
Separate difficulties attend any attempt rigorously to measure the costs, as opposed to the
benefits, of copyright protection. The public’s interest in preserving the public domain, although
real, may prove resistant to quantification. At present, efforts to measure the economic value of
See BLAYNE HAGGART, COPYFIGHT: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT REFORM vii (2014)
(“it’s a three-hundred-year-old policy and only now we’re starting to ask for evidence? That’s the copyright debate
in a nutshell.”).
344

See WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT ch. 2 (2011) (ridiculing current copyright policy as “faithbased” and calling for a stronger empirical support); see also, e.g., Ivan P.L. Png, Copyright: A Plea for Empirical
Research, 3(2) REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3 (2006) (identifying several areas where further data need
to be developed).
345

See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2015); Symposium: Steps Toward Evidence-Based IP, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1757 (2014); Peter DiCola,
Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. 301 (2013); Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of
Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669 (2006). Cf. Samuelson et al., supra note 110, at 1205–06 (proposing
new empirical policy research capabilities and staff for the U.S. Copyright Office).
346

See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 119–20 (2009) (noting very small
number of “players” in recorded entertainment industry); HAGGART, supra note 344, at 102–03 (noting profitability
of content industries and the advantages in access and messaging that their size confers); Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) (tracing influence of affected
industries on drafting of legislation that became the Copyright Act of 1976).
347

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
125 (2011); Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions,
13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 92–93 (1994); American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2517–18
(2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
348

See, e.g., I.P.L. Png, On the Reliability of Software Piracy Statistics, 9 ELEC. COMM. RESEARCH &
APPLICATIONS 365 (2010).
349
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copyright’s exceptions, such as the fair use doctrine,350 may represent the best proxy for
estimating the public’s stake in copyright policy; yet those efforts remain in their infancy and
their limitations remain readily apparent.
Finally, there is clearly a limit to how far data can take copyright policy. Copyright
protection that is either too strong or too weak may prevent some expressive works from coming
into existence at all.351 Assigning an economic value to a nonexistent work would be a
speculative exercise, akin to measuring the height of a building that was never constructed.
Furthermore, personal, noncommercial uses of copyrighted works may be culturally very
important but are also exceedingly difficult to measure.352 The law’s effects on such
noncommercial uses, while potentially substantial, may also tend to escape consideration in any
quantitative analysis.
B. Explanations Focusing on Congress
To explain the failure of reformist copyright scholarship to exert a similar level of
influence on policy as Chicago School writings did on antitrust law, one should also consider the
role of Congress. Despite the large role Congress contemplated for the courts in developing
substantive copyright law, copyright is governed directly by statutory language to a much greater
extent than antitrust law.353 Thus, it is worth spending a little time examining the possibility that
reformist copyright scholarship has exerted limited influence thus far because of its failure to
prompt the enactment of new legislative protections for the public domain.
Because copyright law is based on the language of a lengthy and complex statute,
perhaps the best hope for copyright reform lies in persuading Congress that greater protections
for the public domain are required. Indeed, with the volume of legislative activity rising in the
last two years (particularly on the House side, where multiple hearings on copyright revision
have been held),354 legislative interest in and attention to copyright issues has reached a height
See, e.g., COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASS’N, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (2011), at http://www.ccianet.org/wpcontent/uploads/library/CCIA-FairUseintheUSEconomy-2011.pdf.
350

351

See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2006) (noting difficulties of
identifying clearly lawful uses under United States law).
352

Cf. supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. All the controversies sketched out in the preceding section of
this article arose in response to the passage of legislation amending the Copyright Act in ways that tended to restrict
the public domain. See supra Part IV.A.
353

The Register of Copyrights’ recent call for statutory revision has kicked off a cycle of subcommittee
hearings in the House of Representatives aimed ultimately at crafting new legislation to replace the 1976 Act. See
Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013); Future of Music Coalition,
House Copyright Review Timeline, at https://www.futureofmusic.org/article/article/house-copyright-review-timeline
(July 20, 2014).
354
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not seen in decades. Congress is listening. It is worth inquiring, therefore, whether reformist
arguments are being advanced in ways that will ultimately foster legislative protections for the
public domain.
Although many would-be copyright reformers write for a generalist audience,355 most of
the previously referenced literature on copyright and the public domain consists of law review
articles.356 Those articles are, in form at least, broadly typical of legal academic writing as a
genre: they are lengthy, densely reasoned, heavily footnoted, and stylistically dry. While other
scholars value the thoroughness and intellectual rigor of their peers’ work, those same qualities
may diminish the usefulness of a scholar’s work for nonspecialist audiences. A busy legislator
(or even a busy staffer) dealing simultaneously with proposals spanning the vast range of
subjects addressed by the United States government may have essentially no capacity to absorb
an argument, no matter how persuasive, articulated in a fifty-page law journal article.357 To the
extent that reformers seek legislative action, other forms of advocacy may serve their arguments
better than the continued expansion of the academic literature on the public domain.
Furthermore, efforts to achieve copyright reform through legislation necessarily bring the
interests of powerful, self-interested actors to the fore. As Justice Breyer observed in Golan,
Congress pays disproportionate attention to the interests of copyright industry incumbents who
believe themselves to be threatened by any change in the status quo.358 This problem is hardly
unique to copyright, of course; defenders of existing policy often enjoy strategic advantages in
In this category I would include many of the copyright-related writings of authors such as Lawrence Lessig,
Richard Stallman, Siva Vaidhyanathan, Clay Shirky, and Cory Doctorow, to name just a few. Pamela Samuelson
writes for both legal scholars and the technology community. William Patry presents a rare example of someone
with feet firmly planted on both the “mass audience” and “academic specialist” sides of the divide; he is
simultaneously the author of multiple short books advocating for copyright reform as well as the multi-volume Patry
on Copyright treatise.
355

356

See generally supra notes 75–106 and accompanying text.

Cf. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE ch. 4 (2009) (noting difficulties
presented in considering any individual policy proposal stemming from issue complexity and the lack of time or
attention available from legislators and staff).
357

Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 907 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress, with one minor exception,
heard testimony only from the representatives of existing copyright holders, who hoped that passage of the statute
would enable them to benefit from reciprocal treatment of American authors abroad”); see also id. at 910 (noting
that arguments presented to Congress in support of the URAA “ directly concern[ed] a private benefit: how to obtain
more money from the sales of existing products” rather than “a public benefit, such as how to promote or to protect
the creative process.”). Perhaps Professor Lessig is correct that the linchpin issue here is the financing of elections;
perhaps it is the case that freeing legislators from a virtually all-consuming preoccupation with financing their own
campaigns (and the resulting solicitude that they exhibit towards the interests of prospective donors) is the
indispensable first step towards refocusing legislative activity on the interests of the broader public. See generally
LESSIG, supra note 6. At present, members of Congress must devote an inordinate portion of their time to
fundraising; solving the election funding problem might also increase the amount of time legislators could spend
developing substantive policy expertise. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
358
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resisting change.359 But the massive size and concentrated structure of the industries who benefit
from existing copyright law, and the extremely diffuse and amorphous interests of the public who
pay copyright’s costs, make the contrast especially stark and further reduce the likelihood of
remedial legislative action.360
But there is yet another complicating factor for advocates of expanded protections for the
public domain. A necessary precondition to meaningful legislative reform is a much broader
agreement on a family of basic principles that may then lead to the drafting of compatible
statutory text.361 There has been little need for legislators to pay attention to the status of the
public domain because for most of copyright’s history, the public domain was not as threatened
as it is today.362 The resulting attitudinal shift among copyright scholars has effectively moved
the public domain from a peripheral to a core concern of the law. Replicating that same
attitudinal shift among copyright policy-makers will likely be the thorniest obstacle to
meaningful legislative revision.363

359

See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 357, at 81–88.

See id. ch. 1 (noting that organizations speaking on behalf of ordinary citizens, despite their numbers, suffer
from pervasive resource disadvantages compared with organizations speaking for industry needs); see also supra
note 347 and accompanying text; but cf. supra note 350 and accompanying text (noting recent efforts to quantify
economic benefits of copyright limitations); PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS 292–93 (2014) (noting that
rising economic importance of technology industry may be beginning to offset content industries’ historical
advantages in setting copyright policy).
360

As Baldwin’s book illustrates, it is increasingly common in contemporary copyright discourse to assume that the
interests of technology companies, broadly speaking, represent an adequate proxy for the interests of the public at
large. The public’s interest in accessing and using expressive works frequently depends upon the availability of
suitable technologies to accomplish that purpose, and technology makers often have a parallel interest in supplying
the demand for such tools. For that reason, among others, technology suppliers often find themselves opposing
assertions of strong proprietary claims by copyright holders. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Of course, the analogy can be pressed too far; where the
issue is privacy rather than copyright, for example, no one would assume that the interests of ordinary consumers
align with those of technology providers.
361

See, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 110.

362

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.

Cf. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 357, ch. 2 (noting that existing policy exerts a form of “friction” that
slows policy change until a significant consensus for a new policy emerges).
363

Another way to import contemporary copyright thinking into Congress would be for copyright scholars to run
successfully for public office. There are those of us who would have enjoyed seeing Professor Lessig serve in the
House (or even, perhaps, as President), although the question of his electability must wait to be decided another day.
See Lawrence Lessig, On suspending my campaign, Nov. 3, 2015, at
http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/132425036707/on-suspending-my-campaign; Julian Sanchez, Netroots seek to send
legal scholar Lessig to Congress, ARS TECHNICA, Feb. 17, 2008, at http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2008/02/netroots-seek-to-send-legal-scholar-lessig-to-congress/; Mike Nizza, Lessig Decides Against Run for
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On the other hand, the revolution in antitrust law tends to undermine the thesis that
lasting policy change depends on legislative action. Congress had essentially no role in the
changes in antitrust law that were sketched out above. Although some members of Congress
(such as Ohio’s Senator Howard Metzenbaum) spoke frequently in opposition to what they
perceived as antitrust law’s growing hospitality toward big business,364 Congressional action
during this period was largely limited to passing occasional nonbinding resolutions expressing
disapproval.365 The example of antitrust law demonstrates that, even in an area of federal law
ultimately governed by statute, lasting policy change can occur despite legislative inactivity.
Thus, although there may be a great many things that advocates of stronger protections for the
public domain might do to persuade Congress to legislate consistently with their views, it
remains an open question whether such action is the best use of reform advocates’ time. The
lesson for would-be copyright reformers from the history of antitrust law is that the obstacles to
legislative revision sketched out above need not doom the broader project to strengthen legal
protections for the public domain, although they may require reform advocates to focus their
attentions outside Congress.
C. Explanations Focusing on the Executive
Given the obstacles to meaningful legislative revision of copyright law and Congress’s
lengthy history of enacting ever greater restrictions upon, rather than protections for, the public
domain, copyright reform advocates might choose to focus greater attention on executive-branch
policymakers. There is unquestionably a rising interest in copyright policy in executive agencies
at present, with the Department of Commerce engaged in a lengthy inquiry into how the present
structure of the law serves the nation’s economic interests.366 The question is whether any of this
attention may be directed toward improving protections for the public domain.
Congress at Internet Speed, N.Y. TIMES NEWS BLOG, Feb. 25, 2008, at
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/25/lessig-decides-against-run-for-congress-at-internet-speed/. In general,
however, whether inside or outside the realm of intellectual property, there are not many examples of legal scholars
directly lobbying Congress (much less seeking elective office themselves) in an effort to have their positions enacted
into law.
See, e.g., Howard Metzenbaum, Report from the United States Senate, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (1981);
Howard M. Metzenbaum, Is William Baxter Anti-Antitrust?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1981, archived at
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/18/business/is-william-baxter-anti-antitrust.html.
364

See, e.g., H. Res. No. 303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 35,184–86 (1985) (disapproving of the
DOJ Antitrust Division’s Vertical Restraints Guidelines as, inter alia, inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dr. Miles, discussed supra notes 21, 52 and accompanying text). Cf. also Alan A. Fisher et al., Do the DOJ
Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 639–40 (1987) (discussing the same
House Resolution as well as political opposition from state attorneys general); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 324, at
951–52 (describing legislative resolution aimed at forbidding DOJ from spending money to articulate certain
economic views in amicus curiae briefs).
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See INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2013) (more commonly known as the “Green Paper”), available at
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1. Reformist Attitudes Among Executive Officials
The first obstacle to relying on executive action to strengthen the public domain stems
from the attitudes of the executive-branch officials with influence over copyright policy.
Advocates for copyright reform lack visible representation in the pertinent executive agencies.
This situation contrasts markedly with the revolution in antitrust law, which was driven to a
substantial degree by changes in enforcement activity at the federal level. Proponents of Chicago
School microeconomic analysis were appointed to positions of decision-making authority in the
agencies charged with antitrust enforcement, whose subsequent enforcement activity reflected
Chicago School principles and priorities.367 To date, would-be copyright reformers have attained
no comparable positions of influence in any recent Administration.368 Perhaps the key to
replicating the transformation of antitrust law in the realm of copyright is to build awareness
among Executive officers and agency staff of the importance of strengthening protections for the
public domain, and to appoint similarly minded individuals to positions of policy influence.
Nevertheless, antitrust offers an imperfect parallel. Executive decisions about
enforcement play a less prominent role in the making of copyright policy than in antitrust law.
Copyright is a form of property right held by an individual author or publisher, and violations of
that right ordinarily are vindicated through a private lawsuit against the accused infringer.369
Because antitrust law is a regulatory regime that takes as its goal the efficient operation of
markets as a whole, it invites a more significant role for government. The government brings
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf. An overview of the Green
Paper’s research and recommendations is available in Shira Perlmutter, Making Copyright Work for a Global
Market: Policy Revision on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49 (2014).
See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003); Marc Allen Eisner & Kenneth J. Meier, Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic
Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 269, 273–74 (1990). For a defense of this
reorientation of Executive-branch enforcement decisions by one of its architects, see William F. Baxter, Separation
of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661 (1981).
367

To consider only one high-profile example: activist Carl Malamud, the founder of the public.resource.org
Web site and one of the lead organizers of the “law.gov” movement, has likely done more than any other single
individual to provide free public access to primary legal source materials. For discussions of Malamud’s work, see,
e.g., Beth Ford, Comment, Open Wide the Gates of Legal Access, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 553–64 (2014). Early in the
Obama Administration, Malamud began waging a (in retrospect, quixotic) campaign to be appointed Public Printer
of the United States, promising to make public domain federal legal information more accessible online. See Carl
Malamud, Prepared Statement, archived at https://yeswescan.org/index.gpo.html (Mar. 15, 2009). The Obama
Administration’s decision to overlook public domain advocates such as Malamud may explain why privately
organized digitization initiatives have so far outpaced the Government Publications Office at producing high-quality
digital archives of public records. See, e.g., Supreme Court of the United States, Bound Volumes, at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes.aspx (providing scanned copies of slightly over ten percent of
the United States Reports, the other ninety percent of which are widely available elsewhere online but have never
been provided by the Government).
368
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See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012).
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more antitrust cases than copyright cases.370 And while there have been pressures for the
Administration to take more aggressive enforcement measures against mass infringement, 371 no
Executive-branch agency enjoys as high a profile in the making and enforcement of copyright
law as both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission occupy in antitrust.
Even if a new Administration were to commit itself to strengthening legal protections for the
public domain through the appointment of sympathetic personnel to positions of policy
influence, it is far from clear which offices should be targeted.
2. Copyright’s Other Executive Constituencies
There is another problem with relying on Executive officials to lead the effort to improve
protections for the public domain that is less easily addressed. The problem here is that the
existing structure of copyright law serves other governmental interests beyond merely promoting
the creation and dissemination of expressive works. Copyright has other Executive
constituencies who may be expected to respond skeptically to any effort to increase protections
for the public domain. Addressing the effects of copyright revision on policy objectives that are
themselves unconnected with copyright’s core purposes may prove to be the most difficult
obstacle to reformist arguments.
A comparison with the history of antitrust revision may illustrate the point. Antitrust
reform was touted as a response to substantive complaints that excessive enforcement was
harming the international competitiveness of key domestic industries (principally by inhibiting
the types of economies of scale that were necessary to compete with vertically integrated foreign
firms).372 Opinions varied as to whether these concerns were valid or supported the significant

For the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, the United States brought 14 of the 799 civil antitrust cases
filed in the federal courts, or just under 2% of the total. This seemingly small number nevertheless represents a far
greater ratio than in copyright litigation: of the 4,041 new civil copyright cases filed during the same period, none
was brought by the United States. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (2014), tbl. C-2. On the criminal side, the
federal government initiated prosecution of 44 antitrust cases and 35 copyright cases during the same period. See id.
tbl. D-2. The figures do not account for the role of state attorneys general, who also litigate more frequently in the
antitrust field.
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See, e.g., Benton Martin & Jeremiah Newhall, Criminal Copyright Enforcement Against Filesharing
Services, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 101 (2013) (discussing prosecution of Megaupload site by United States
government).
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See, e.g., Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition
and Antitrust, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (1990) (arguing that United States law inhibited forms of efficient inter-firm
cooperation that foreign firms used); Malcolm Baldrige, Two Areas of Antitrust Law in Need of Reform, 1983 DET.
C.L. REV. 1035 (arguing that antitrust law should permit more horizontal collaboration among United States
competitors); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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alterations in antitrust policy that they actually produced,373 but the point for present purposes is
simply that this was in fact the justification that was offered contemporaneously by government
officials for reformulating United States antitrust law. This rationale fitted well with existing
constituencies in the Executive Branch who sought to promote overseas market access by U.S.
firms. Small wonder, then, that some of the most enthusiastic cheerleading for the reorientation
of antitrust law came not from antitrust officials at the DOJ and FTC, but from the exportpromoting U.S. Department of Commerce.374
The same constituencies who supported revision of the antitrust laws in the name of
promoting global trade, however, may resist moves to strengthen the public domain in copyright
law. Particularly in view of the United States’ long-term trade deficit in goods and services,375
policy makers may view the maintenance of the nation’s large trade surplus in intellectual
property as a significant policy imperative.376 Because any policy change that lessens the need
for the payment of royalties to United States publishers, media companies, software companies,
or other IP-intensive industries will have a negative impact on the nation’s balance of payments,
such changes will invite critical scrutiny from economic policy-makers.
It is not easy to envision how advocates of stronger protections for the public domain will
formulate a persuasive response to the objection that reversing the historic trends towards everstronger, ever-lengthier copyright protection in the United States will redound to the nation’s
competitive disadvantage. One answer may be to argue that such international competitive
concerns have nothing to do with the core purposes of copyright law (namely, to encourage the
creation of new works) and are therefore irrelevant.377 Those core purposes, however, have
carried little force in international debates over copyright, where negotiators have been
motivated far more by perceived national interests in the costs and benefits of any given
See, e.g., Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Horizontal Merger Policy: Promoting Competition and
American Competitiveness, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 871 (1986); Donald I. Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest
in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 16 (1974).
373

See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Joint Ventures, Antitrust, and Transnational Cartelization, 11
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 433, 435–36 (1991) (quoting several Commerce Department officials); Baldrige, supra note
372.
374

The trade deficit stood at –$476 billion in 2013, representing a manufacturing deficit of over $700 billion
partly offset by a $225 billion surplus in services. See generally Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, International Economic Accounts, at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm (providing data for
download in a variety of formats).
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See, e.g., Lionel Bently, R. v the Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 1, 57–59 (2008) (recognizing and criticizing the tendency of U.S. copyright policy to focus on export
promotion). Diminishing competition in the U.S. market from infringing imports serves the same policy objective,
simply from the opposite direction, and is also a longstanding feature of U.S. law. See 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2012);
but cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (statute’s prohibition on infringing imports does
not reach copy of work the making of which was lawful under the law of the nation in which it was produced).
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This is essentially Justice Breyer’s position. See supra notes 184, 301 and accompanying text.
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proposal. Refocusing the international debate on how best to encourage the creation and use of
expressive works (concerns that have been influential at the national level) would be a valuable
step,378 but one that would require trade negotiators to discard analytical constructs to which they
have been long habituated.379 If United States policymakers remain focused on the effects of
copyright law on national revenues, then perhaps public-domain advocates should emphasize the
potential expansion of expressive output (and the corresponding expansion of possible licensing
arrangements) that would occur if more robust protections for the public domain are enacted,380
although this argument would be subject to the same evidentiary difficulties addressed above.381
The way forward on this issue is presently unclear. Developing research to counter the concerns
of other Executive Branch policymakers who have influence over the direction of copyright law
may represent the most challenging imperative for advocates of greater protections for the public
domain.
D. Explanations Focusing on the Judiciary
As an alternative to relying on legislative or executive action, copyright reform advocates
might continue to focus their attentions on the judiciary. As already noted, however, the
outpouring of scholarship on the public domain in the last two decades has yet to exert much of
an impact on judicial decisions. The mere production of additional scholarship on the public
domain may be a necessary, but clearly not a sufficient, step to achieving more favorable results
in actual litigated disputes.
In the antitrust arena, some of the scholars most strongly associated with Chicago School
economics received high-profile judicial appointments during the Reagan Administration: Judges
Posner and Easterbrook to the Seventh Circuit, and Judge Bork to the D.C. Circuit. At present, at
least, advocates for copyright reform cannot claim anything approaching the same level of
intellectual influence on the bench. Indeed, even jurists relatively favorably inclined towards
protecting the public domain, such as Judge Kozinski and Justice Breyer, occasionally strain to
find copyright infringement in dubious circumstances.382 Copyright law necessarily involves
Cf. KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 33–35 (2012) (arguing that requiring less-developed nations to
meet most-developed nations’ standards of IP protection results in overall global levels of protection that exceed the
welfare-maximizing level); Gregory N. Mandel, Leveraging the International Economy of Intellectual Property, 75
OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2014) (developing this insight principally from the perspective of patent policy).
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See supra note 116.

See, e.g., supra notes 78–87 (noting that increasing the scope of the public domain will reduce the cost of
creating future expressive works and spur additional creative output).
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Cf. supra notes 351–352 and accompanying text.

Compare American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (majority opinion of
Breyer, J.), with, e.g., Ira Steven Nathenson, Aereo’s Errors, 2 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 171 (2014); Matthew Sag, The
Uncertain Scope of the Public Performance Right After American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc. (Dec. 19,
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2529047; Sarah E. Claypool, Comment, Aereo, Unlicensed
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balancing the interests of putative property owners against those of users of expressive works, of
course, and it is not surprising that different decision-makers might strike the balance differently
from one case to the next. Nevertheless, the absence of a critical mass of serving judges as well
schooled in the body of literature on the public domain as Reagan-era appointees were in lawand-economics literature may explain why the former body of scholarship has proven less
influential with the courts.
The antitrust revolution may reveal a good deal about the effect on policy of changes in
the composition of the courts. For example, although only ten years elapsed between the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Schwinn and GTE Sylvania,383 only three of the Justices who
decided Schwinn were still on the Court when GTE Sylvania overruled Schwinn.384 Although no
one would suggest that the world needs more ideological litmus tests for prospective judicial
nominees, it is quite clear that judges’ viewpoints matter to case outcomes. Efforts to encourage
more awareness of the purpose and importance of the public domain among judges and
prospective judges, accordingly, appear to represent a desirable step for would-be copyright
reformers.
VI.

Conclusion

A strong consensus exists among disinterested copyright experts that the structure of
existing law excessively restricts the public domain and thereby disserves the public interest.
Copyright legislation, treaty-making, and case law, however, have proven remarkably resistant to
the insights developed in copyright scholarship on the public domain over the past quarter
century. Comparing copyright history with the development of antitrust law reveals that there is
Retransmissions, and Emerging Technologies: The Case for Congressional Action, 100 IOWA L. REV. — (2015,
forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2490133; and compare Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258
(9th Cir. 2014) (majority opinion of Kozinski, J.), with, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives and IP in Garcia v.
Google and Beyond, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 37 (Aug. 20, 2014); Paul M. Azzi, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make A
Copyright: The Dangerous Implication of Granting a Copyright in Performance Per Se, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 529
(2014). The full Court of Appeals later rejected Judge Kozinski’s decision as an unwarranted expansion of the scope
of copyright. Garcia v. Google Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740–44 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); cf. id. at 749–53 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
383

See supra notes 25, 48 and accompanying text.

Justices William Brennan, Potter Stewart, and Byron White were members of both the Schwinn and GTE
Sylvania Courts, although Justice White did not participate in the decision in Schwinn. The other two Justices
articulated consistent positions in the two cases: Justice Brennan joined the Schwinn majority but dissented in GTE
Sylvania, and Justice Stewart dissented in Schwinn but joined the majority in GTE Sylvania.
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In the intervening years, however, Chief Justice Warren Burger had replaced Chief Justice Earl Warren; Justice
Harry Blackmun had replaced Justice Abe Fortas (who authored Schwinn); Justice John Paul Stevens had replaced
Justice William O. Douglas; Justice Lewis F. Powell (who authored GTE Sylvania) had replaced Justice Hugo Black;
Justice William Rehnquist had replaced the second Justice John Marshall Harlan; and Justice Thurgood Marshall
had replaced Justice Tom C. Clark.
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nothing inevitable about this state of affairs; that insights developed in legal scholarship can and
do alter the content of substantive law.385 It is worthwhile to ask, therefore, what is different
about copyright law; why the existing structure of the law seems to command so little regard
from disinterested scholars whose professional careers revolve around studying copyright, and
why lawmakers seem to exhibit dismissive attitudes toward the professional copyright literature.
Why do so many of the participants in the copyright ecosystem appear to be talking past one
another? The question lacks a single readily apparent answer, although perhaps some of the
possible answers developed in the preceding section contain fractional portions of the truth.
For legal scholars, recommendations are difficult to formulate. It would be tempting to
conclude that the insularity of scholarly work is the underlying problem here and that scholars
must engage more directly with courts and policymakers to have a hope of influencing
substantive legal change. It is certainly true that the corpus of scholarly literature on the public
domain canvassed above largely avoids addressing thorny “how” questions: how can society
ensure that courts make better informed decisions; how can we influence Congress to look
beyond the economic interests of the industries whose lobbyists work assiduously to curry their
attention and favor when setting policy; how can scholars’ insights best be incorporated into
substantive law. Some greater engagement with those sorts of issues might serve would-be
copyright reformers’ long-term goals, even if they do not go as far as Professor Lessig and exit
the field to focus full-time on campaign finance reform.
On the other hand, scholars have good reasons to shy away from the messy endeavor of
real-world policy-making and to treat such “how” questions as outside the purview of legal
scholarship. Doing so helps assure readers of legal scholarship that scholars’ views are
undistorted by personal bias or a stake in the outcome of the controversies on which they report.
Some of the impartiality that I have suggested is important to well-reasoned decision-making is
lost if scholars take too prominent a role in the political and judicial process. Drafting books,
articles, and perhaps the occasional amicus brief is about as close to the process as a legal scholar
can get without raising suspicions that one’s scholarship is a mere stalking horse for the interests
of one’s clients.
For governmental actors, it is a little easier to speak definitively. No one can make Chief
Justice Roberts or Judge Edwards read a law review article if they don’t want to. Their decisions
carry the same precedential force either way. Yet proudly trumpeting one’s disengagement from
the corpus of professional literature in one’s own field is a poor way to inspire confidence as an
informed and impartial decision-maker. Unless law is simply politics, then the views of
disinterested experts deserve a fair hearing in any forum that aspires to correctness and
legitimacy. The fact that courts and other policymakers have in fact relied on legal scholarship to
One might equally well consider how the law of privacy (see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)), or trademark (see Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927)), or many other substantive doctrines developed in response to
legal scholars’ arguments. Antitrust supplies a recent, but hardly the only, illustration of this broader point.
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undertake far-reaching transformative projects in the past shows, I hope, that law is not simply
politics and that ideas matter. Judge Wisdom had it right: decision-makers need to engage with
scholarship rather than ignore it.
Whether or not one approves of the results, the reformist antitrust scholarship that
emerged a half-century ago undeniably accomplished something tangible: it supplied the basis
for wholesale judicial revision of antitrust doctrine to fit better with the scholarly consensus.
Understanding why legal change does, or does not, occur in response to evolution in scholarly
thinking is a worthwhile exercise for those interested in meaningful copyright reform in the
public interest. What distinguishes successful law reform efforts from those that fail? When
advocates of greater protections for the public domain develop a robust answer to that question,
the benefits to the law and to the public interest will be substantial indeed.
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